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Thermoamylovorans, 45 INT'L J. SYSTEMATIC BACrERIOLOGY 9, 9 (1995); E.E. Osim
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MED. J. 959, 959 (1991). In many West African societies, offering and drinking palm-
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the brew, but the ritual of its presentation. See, e.g., CH[NUA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL
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at dawn and dusk. Quintessentially a tropical product, the disintegrating processes of the
palm-wine appear impervious to arrest by standard refrigeration.
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LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

One day, they brought a man to give the ministers and the parliamentarians and the party activists a lecture .... The man had many
degrees, and he was very boring. In the first place, he was dressed like
a poor man .... and for a long time, he spoke to us about Economics.
They say he was telling us about how to make poor countries rich;
something called stages of growth .... I woke up when I heard some
clapping. The others also woke up and we all clapped and said "yah,
yah!" Then the attorney-general who was one of our party scholars got
up to give a vote of thanks.
"You have told us, Professor so and so the stages of growth. We
thank you very much for having told us about your specialty ....
Now, we shall share our special knowledge here with you. We present
the stages of booze .... Stage one, the mood jocose; stage two, the
mood morose; stage three, the mood bellicose; stage four, the mood
necrimose; stage five, the mood comatose."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Before "law and economics," "law and literature," "law and ...
became established fixtures in the American legal education curriculum,
there was "law and development." In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a
recognizable cadre of legal scholars, foundation grantors, and government
officials emerged touting the relevance of inquiry into and the promotion
of law and legal institutions for the social and economic development of
the newly emerging or modernizing states of Africa, Latin America,
Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. Sprouting from field work
sponsored by development agencies and private foundations, writings on
the significance of law for nation-building, economic growth, and social
justice blossomed with brilliance for barely a decade, and with equal
suddenness withered. Excepting the occasional seminar - taken by and
taught mainly to exchange students from developing countries - and the
reminiscences of a practitioner, a discipline that had flourished brightly
became virtually invisible, even as the academic community of the law
school in the late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed perhaps its greatest
period of ferment in the critical exploration of ideas.2

' AYi Kwm ARMAH, THE BEAuTYFuL ONES ARE NOT YET BORN 132-33
(Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. 1985) (1969).
2 See, e.g., Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 OIo ST.
LJ. 599, 602-32 (1989) (reviewing the law and economics, critical legal studies, and
critical feminist theory movements); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism
in the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1439, 1479-87 (1994) (discussing
the "law and literature" and "critical legal studies" movements). Professors David
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The dissolution of Communist governments in Eastern Europe and
the restructuring of East European and Latin American economies to emphasize the role of private actors is again generating pronounced interest
in American academic legal and governmental circles, demonstrating
claimed linkages between law and economic performance.3 It is unclear
how long this interest will last, but it has led to proselytizing and economic missionary activities and undertakings not unlike those that dominated law and development inquiries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Although somewhat less obvious to mainstream opinion-shapers, substantial programs of political and economic restructuring emphasizing pluralism and the preeminence of private actors are afoot even in the backwaters of Africa.4 These developments, influenced no less by policy-makers
and consultants to international financial institutions in Washington as by
local African policy-makers, have resuscitated questions that were shelved
prematurely by the sudden demise of the law and development movement
- questions that are not dissimilar nor unrelated to those that a genuine
search for answers should raise in the mind of any but the most unalloyed propagandist.
This Article inquires into the revival of interest in the relevance of
law for development in the less-developed or Third World countries. Although the focus of this Article is Sub-Saharan Africa, many of the issues
and ideas considered have resonance for other areas of the world. The
ideas expressed have certainly been enriched by work done by others in
diverse regions of the world, and this Article freely borrows the insights
of those studies.

Trubek and Henry Schlagel have documented the substantial contributions of scholars
originally involved in the law and development movement to the founding and growth
of critical legal studies in the late 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., David Trubek, Back to
the Future: The Short Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1, 4, 37 n.71 (1990) [hereinafter Trubek, Short Happy Life]; John Henry
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391 (1984). Cf David Trubek,
Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82
YALE L.J. 3 n.7 (1972) [hereinafter Trubek, Social Theory] (listing contributors to law
and development scholarship).
' See generally Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101179, 103 Stat. 1298, 1299-1300 (1989) (linking the development of democratic institutions and political pluralism with the promotion of a free market economic system in
East European countries).
" For lively and sympathetic accounts of some of these changes on the daily lives
of Africans, see, e.g., BLANE HARDEN, AFRICA: DESPATCHES FROM A FRAGILE CONTlNENT

(1990);

ROBERT KLrrGAARD, TROPICAL GANGSTERS (1991).
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The Article begins with a restatement of the teachings of the first
law and development movement. The restatement is important because it
helps place in context the current revival of law and development. Next,
the Article recounts economic and political developments between the first
law and development movement and the current revival. Third, the Article
explores the nature of the revival of law and development, paying attention to the similarities and differences between the new and old learning.
Fourth, the Article evaluates and critiques the collective teachings; and
finally, suggests an alternative conceptual framework for investigating,
presenting, and nurturing the role of law in development. The Article
contends that the relevance of law for development must be grounded in
the experiences of the society under study and in ways giving form and
meaning to those experiences by their institutionalization, not through
internationalizing the societies, nor through a universalist or global
conception of procedural mechanisms or substantive rights and duties.
Throughout the Article, recreation of the past and interpretation of
the present is self-consciously transdisciplinary because the development
of legal ideas about development and law have been stunted by a remarkable unidirectional flow of propulsive impact from the social sciences.
Legal theory shamelessly has bought into or borrowed from theories of
economic and political development, but has not repaid the debt in any
currency of its own. In turn, the social sciences have taken law and legal
institutions as a static, or in their parlance, as an epiphenomenon.

II. THE FIRST LAW AND DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT
A. Origins
Most movements are at once the product of shared interests and
divergent views as to how identifiable objectives may be realized.5 Since
both interests and views tend to be dynamic, each having direct influenc-

' The term "movement" is used to denote a distinguishable set of views relating
to a subject shared by a body of persons who view themselves as distinct. But see
Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 24 (commenting that his earlier implication
that a movement is "a unified group of people sharing common views and goals" is
misleading because of the "many different currents of thought about law, society, and

social science in the movement"). Whether a sufficient consensus exists among a group
of people, and whether that consensus is a shared subject to suggest the existence of
a movement has been a focus of argument among American legal scholars in recent
years. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE
LJ. 1515, 1516 (1991); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983) (stating that definitional consistency and certitude may be
important for participants in a movement who seek to define the elements of their
commitment in terms of a clear and active political agenda).
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es on the formulation and structure of the other, stating and describing
the elements of any movement must necessarily be incomplete, with the
significance of some features overstated at some times and understated at
others. The following description of the law and development movement,
which can reasonably be said to have reached its apogee in the first half
of the 1970s, provides a conceptual representation of the epitome of the

movement.
The law and development movement may be classified into four
strands. The most prolific writers and articulate spokesmen of the movement were American legal academics, many of whom began as crusaders
for U.S. foreign assistance to the newly emerging countries of Africa,
Latin America, and Tropical Asia.6 Deriving their implicit assumptions of
what constitutes development from the prevailing socio-economic and
political liberalism of Western (and particularly American) industrial and
post-industrial society,7 these liberal legalist scholars confronted the relevance of law to the formation of like societies in Africa, Latin America,
and Asia.8
The second group consisted primarily of decision-makers from the
countries of the "South," Western technocrats, consultants, and publicists

6

See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIAuSM: AMERIcAN LAwYERs AND FOREIGN

AID iN LATIN AMERICA 6-7 (1980); see also Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of "Law
and Development," 1982 Wis. L. REv. 373 (book review).
' "West" and its derivatives as used in this Article refer to the industrial states and
societies of Western and Northern Europe, and those of North America that conventionally are defined as embracing liberal-democratic ideology, the privately organized
capitalist mode of production, and a preference for economic distribution through selfregulating market exchange. Archetypes of these societies are the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Depending on the context, the reach of the term
may include other countries such as Australia and Japan which, while falling outside
of the standard geographical boundaries, fully embrace the defining socio-political and
economic structures possessed by Western societies.
' See David M. Trnbek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
Wis. L. REv. 1062, 1070; see also Trbek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2,at 21-22
(referring to liberal legalists as imperial legal scholars and imperial jurists). Professors
Galanter and Trubek assert that proponents of liberal legalism share common views
relating to two basic tenets: "(1) a general model of the relationship between law and
society, and (2) a specific explanation of the relationship between legal systems and
development." Trubek & Galanter, supra, at 1070, 1071.
9 The term "South" is employed to designate those countries of Africa, Latin
America, and East and Southeast Asia commonly characterized by economists as
nonindustrialized, less-developed, developing, and underdeveloped and by sociologists
and political scientists as modernizing, Third World, and nonaligned.
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who wielded law as a practical instrument in the argument for restructuring the international economic order. This group and a third group
consisting of lawyers and academics from the South and the West sought
to employ law in the conventional sense of seeking to resolve specific
disputes between private investors and the states of the South to unite to
form the "pragmatic internationalists."
Finally, a small number of intellectuals sought to situate the relevance of law to development within the context of the neo-Marxist
analytical and structural framework then prevalent in academic social
science theory and exemplified in the works of dependency and underdevelopment scholars.
Despite their numerous theoretical and methodological differences,
these groups all took as given certain key concepts that form the focus of
exploration in Part IV. These shared axioms are worth highlighting
because they provide the organizational skeleton for much of the following description.
First, although varying somewhat in their emphasis, each group
viewed law and development as more or less autonomous concepts related
only by virtue of the role of the state. Second, the identity of the state
was assumed to be a known quantity."0 Third, the primary orientation of
the functions of the state was outward; that is, the state acted predominantly, if not exclusively, in terms of its interests vis-A-vis its place in the
international system. The state was thus endowed with plenary capacity to
act within its borders. Fourth, the meaning of law was taken generally as
self-evident, and commentators tended to present and view the rule of law
and the promotion of development as positive attributes of society found
in the West, but requiring growth and maturity in much of the South.
B. Liberal Legalism
Liberal legalists provided the most highly developed articulation of
law and development. Despite being consciously self-analytical," there
was remarkable consensus within the movement on the origins, purpose,
content, and style of their scholarship. For these writers, law and development studies was a special circumstance of the broader inquiry into the

10

But see infra Part II.D (discussing dependency and underdevelopment theories).

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RuTGERS L. REv.
11 (1969) [hereinafter Friedman, On Legal Development]; Trubek & Galanter, supra
note 8, at 1067; Eliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and
Critique of Lawyers in Self-Estrangement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1977); John Henry
Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 457 (1977).
"
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relationship of law and society. 2 Four factors conjoined to generate and
sustain law and development as a distinct field of study.
First, the competitive ideological environment of the Cold War
opened both private and public purse strings in the United States for
programs that would encourage the less-developed countries of the
Southern Hemisphere to line-up with capitalist states. International law
provided the most powerful rhetoric for assuring these nonaligned societies that the ideas they were asked to embrace were principled and objectively neutral. The private sector, led by the Ford Foundation, was
innovative and influential, 3 such that when funding from these private
sources dried up, the movement shriveled as well.14 Public funding blossomed with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," and
mushroomed in the late 1960s as the Johnson Administration
employed
6
foreign aid directly in the war against Communism.
See, e.g., Burg, supra note 11, at 516-17; Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture
and Social Development, 4 L. & Soc'y. REv. 29, 29 (1969) [hereinafter Friedman,
Culture and Social Development]; Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2, at 1; Merryman,
supra note 11, at 464-65.
"3 See Merryman, supra note 11, at 457. The earliest major private funding of law
and development studies is generally said to be that of the Harvard International Tax
Program by the Ford Foundation in 1952. See id. at 457 n.4. In 1966, the foundation
created an independent entity (the International Legal Center) to sponsor and monitor
work in the area. The mission statement of the center is an exemplary statement of the
mood of the times:
Working with U.S., foreign, and international agencies, foundations, universities, and
practicing lawyers and jurists, the center will stimulate and support systematic study of
the role of law in international relations and the development of modem nations. The
center will also be concerned with recruitment and training to expand the ranks of
lawyers, social scientists, and others qualified to work on problems of law and development and with projects to help developing countries establish legal institutions essential
to the functioning of modern free societies.
Id. at 459 n.6. (quoting FoRD FOUNDATION, 1966 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1967)).
Other private entities, notably the Asia Foundation and American Bar Foundation,
also made contributions to the law and development project. See Merryman, supra note
11, at 457-58 n.4; see also Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American
Law and Legal Institutions Help Developing Countries? 1972 Wis. L. REv. 767
(summarizing findings of funded empirical research).
"' See Merryman, supra note 11, at 459-60 (associating the demise of law and
development studies to the withdrawal of foundation funding);see also Burg, supra note
11, at 496 n.17 (listing studies by the Ford Foundation).
IS See Franck, supra note 13, at 767, 768.
16 See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 11, at 457; Burg, supra note 11, at 495. Law
and development was not unique among academic disciplines in its deployment in the
war against Communism. Other fields, notably economics and political science, wade
in much earlier. See, e.g., WALT W. RosTow, STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTHM A
12

1971
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Second, the availability of talented and dedicated experts was essential to the implementation of the policies enumerated. These were precisely the creatures being molded in the revitalized classrooms of post-World
War II American universities. These classrooms emphasized the instru-17
mental use of the social sciences to promote human development.
Research was relevant for the empirical data it gathered in the service of
this goal. 8 Such empiricism presented law like other social sciences as
an objectivist statement of reality, subject to manipulation by rational
rules. 9 These beliefs did not originate in the classrooms, but reflected
the tenor, if not the precise nature, of the systemic beliefs embedded in
prevailing social thought."°
Third, for the elites in many emerging developing countries, the
successful post-colonial experience of the United States offered an inspirational alternative to an otherwise inevitable reattachment to a neocolonialist's umbilical cord only recently severed from the departure of the
European colonial powers. These elites were receptive vehicles for the
arguments of liberal legalists who posited the potential for common cause
between developing country needs and principled U.S. objectives.2 They
NON-COMMUNIS MANfEsTo 162-66 (1960) (economics); Seymour Martin Lipsett, Some
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53
AM. POi Sci. REV. 69, 95 (1959) (comparing democracy and other political groups
through a sociological analysis). Cf. Merryman, supra note 11, at 458 n.4 (noting that
the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act authorized research and assistance in building
democratic institutions). Remarkably, these intellectual disciplines sought to counter
Communism by adopting much of the methodology of Marxist analysis. For example,

they relied on a structuralist approach of historical determinism that sought to demonstrate by empirical evidence a theory of ineluctable movement from a traditional or
feudalist society to an advanced modem one. For the classic Marxist statement, see V.
L LENIN, ImPERIAUSMt THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1917) (using historical
determinism to explain the imperialistic tendencies of the major capitalist states of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
'" See generally Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Realism
to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE LJ. 1344 (1947).
Is See id. On the significance of this orientation for law and development studies
in the 1960s and 1970s, and a self-conscious of the method, see Trubek, Short Happy
Life, supra note 2, at 40-46.
,9 See Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 19-20.
2 As Professor Trubek has stated in the context of Law and Development
The postwar period was a time in which lawyers thought they could devise relatively
unproblematic systems of social governance and transformation. The legal culture of the
time encouraged them to believe in law as a powerful instnument to change society, and
- at the same time - as a repository of standards and principles for the governance of
social life.
Id. at 21.
21 See Franck, supra note 13, at 771 (contending that the question of law and

176

CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.

[Vol. 29:167

contended that the coalescing of interests could be viewed in attractive
terms offered by the United States for the forging of the relationship.

Fourth, liberal legalism pointed to normative components in law and
development. Aside from the favorable economic terms as institutionalized
in foreign aid assistance, it was also moral.' The new order was thus

normatively presented as embracing the satisfaction of utilitarian needs
and the construction of socially well-ordered communities. This version of
law and development offered something to all. To the American pragmatists engaged in implementing the civilizing mission' there was the exportation of democratic capitalism, American technology, and efficient
government;24 to Third World countries, there was the promise of brick,
mortar, and steelworks to mould their societies into the desired image.
Yet "something was missing. No one was actively 'developing' the rule
of law."' In short, the physical transformations being wrought in these
societies, if they were to take root and survive, needed a soul to go along
with them.
The content of the law and development studies that thus emerged
reflected all four driving impulses. The law to be studied and evaluated
was bourgeois in the sense that it was pragmatically and instrumentally
geared towards the reproduction of a middle-class dominated economic

development for the new societies is how to assure orderly radical change: a problem
that implicates law as authority and law as socialization, and law's respective roles in
the three stages of development national political unification; economic industrialization;
and social welfare).
' The conventional elaboration of this point is generally taken to be President
Dwight D. Eisenhower's response to the Suez crisis of 1956. But other instances
abound where the United States, acting purportedly on moral grounds, took positions
adverse to the ex-colonial powers and in support of the emerging states. See generally
ROBERT A. PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMEICA AND THE TBIRD WORLD: POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IDEAS IN FOREIGN AID AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3-8 (1973) (reviewing and
analyzing the origins and persistence of doctrines and theories in the American liberal
tradition);see also Franck, supra note 13, at 767. Cf. William 0. Douglas, Lawyers of
the Peace Corps, 48 A.B.A. J. 909, 910 (1962) ("Young nations need teachers from
the West by the hundreds and thousands-law teachers, professors of government,
research assistants. We must not miss out on this opportunity for service - for
participation in the long creative period ahead of legal development in over half the
world.").
23 See DAvID E. APTER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT:. MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY,
AND POSTMODERN POLITICS 23 (1987) (stating that "[a] perennial search .. . was for
the functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic, that Holy Grail of many modernization . .. theorists").
24 See Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 23-24.
See id.
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and political regime in the developing countries. The project was first and

foremost that of lawyering. To be reproduced was the law for nurturing,
shaping, and controlling a bureaucratic and pluralist state.' It priced the
conversion of the middle-class or professional elites of developing countries through scholarship exchange programs and U.S. scholars funded to
teach at universities located in the developing countries.' It gave lipservice to poverty or progressive lawyering.s The study of such law was

desirable because it carried with it the potential to transform backward,
impoverished, traditional, and dependent societies into modem, technologically advanced, and politically sophisticated industrial states. Western
intellectual and Third World elite alike applauded this manifestation of
progress because it confirmed the correctness of the growing transcendent
belief in humanity's capacity to control and shape for the good the
physical, moral, and political aspects of its environment,29 and it believed
in the potential for a peaceful revolution where the excesses of poverty
and bondage would be eviscerated, leaving modem humanity with a more

egalitarian world.'
Although there was much eclecticism in the methodology adopted by
the liberal legalists in furtherance of these objectives, three approaches
merit attention. First, the earliest converts to law and development studies
were practicing lawyers who had been deputized to the developing
countries by entities such as the U.S. Agency for International Develop-

26 See e.g., ROBERT SEIDMAN, THE LAW, STATE AND DEvELOPMENT IN AFRICA 64
(1978) (contrasting the goals of the law and development project in terms of the
reduction of poverty and oppression through the radiation of privately ordered contract
law and state-led "law of the plan." Kenneth Karst, Law And Developing Countries, 60
L. LIBR. J. 13, 17 (1967); Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussing the
effectiveness of law in attaining social goals).
27 See, e.g., Franck, supra note 13, at 770; Friedman, On Cultural Development,
supra note 12, at 11-12.
' In addition to sponsoring scholarship on law and development, the Ford Foundation created a committee to explore the issue of the provision of legal services to the
poor in developing societies. See Merryman, supra note 11, at 460 n.8. Access to legal
services for the poor in developing societies is the true theme of a collection of essay
in LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1163.
' In this context, Ayi Kwei Armah's vignette quoted at the beginning of this
Article - clearly intended as a parody of Professor Rostow's theory of the stages of
economic growth is particularly poignant. In his novel, Armah depicts the sad moral,
economic, and social decay of a Ghana for which the promise of decolonization
disintegrates into putrid and foul-smelling corruption, and ultimately, a military coup
d'etat. See ARMAH, supra note 1.
" But see Franck, supra note 13, at 768.
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ment (AID) as technical advisers or professional legal specialists. For

these practitioners turned scholars, the focus of interest was the capacity
of modem legal institutions and practices to change traditional behav-

ior.3 Although rarely explicitly articulated, they had a well-developed

conception of modernity, and that notion proximated their vision of the
structure and role of law in American society.32 Thus, they were bound
to study the role and significance of law by defining law in the conventional sense of legislative, judicial, and administrative acts intended to
create incentives for desired behavior and sanctions for disfavored behavior.3 The role of the state and the extent to which it could harmoniously
and expeditiously generate and enforce applicable rules of conduct were
thus critical to the understanding of modem law. The success of the field
of study was measured against the capacity of law and legal institutions
to replicate either the idealized regime, or more accurately, its U.S.
See Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 23.
We devised grand programs to re-educate Third World lawyers who we felt had failed
to understand the mix of pragmatic instrumentalism and liberal idealism that had been
the staple of our legal education. By exporting the educational techniques of the American law school - socratic method, social science and all - we would strengthen legal
institutions just as AID agricultural technicians were transforming small yellow eggs into
large white ones.

31

Id.

For a contemporaneously influential definition of what constitutes "modem law,"
see Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION 153, 154-65 (Myron
Weiner ed., 1966) (identifying several dichotomies and eleven attributes that distinguish
modem from traditional law: arguing modem law reflects tendencies towards unity, uniformity, and universality of legal principles and processes; personal law is replaced by
territorial law; special law by general law; customary law by statute law; corporate
rights and responsibilities by individual ones; religious sanctions and inspirations by
secular motives and techniques; and moral intuition by technical expertise).
[Miodem law is transactional. Rights and obligations are apportioned as they result from
transactions (contractual, tortious, criminal and so on) between parties rather than aggregated in unchanging clusters that attach to persons because of determinants outside the
particular transactions.
Id. at 154.
Notwithstanding the caveats in Professor Galanter's seminal article that he was describing a model, that our "model does not represent a goal to be pursued for its own
sake," and that "[t]hese features of a modem legal system are not necessarily a good
thing per se," it is fair to say that liberal legalists envisioned successful development
as the realization of the features of modem law that he posits. Id. at 154, 164.
33 See, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 26, at 74-76; BRuN-Orro BRYDE, THE POLITICS
AND SOCIOLOGY OF AFRICAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 87-91 (1976) (discussing the
influence of Western law on African legal development); CSABA VARGA, MODERNIZATION OF LAW AND ITS CODIFICATIONAL TRENDS IN THE AFRO-AsiATIc LEGAL DEvELOPMENT (1976).
32
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counterpart. A departure of law in action from law in the books,' at
least to the extent that departure was noticeably greater than generally
accepted or tolerated in the United States, indicated failure."
Second, given the driving impulses behind the funding of law and
development studies by AID and private foundations, two types of
scholars were likely to be dominant.36 The most likely American law

teachers to receive such fellowships were those interested or engaged in
comparative legal research,37 or those who viewed law as an instrument

' This phrase owes its origins to Roscoe Pound, one of the early proponents of the
legal realism school to which the law and society movement owes much. See, e.g.,
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1912). See also Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 18-22 (explaining the influence of legal realism on the law and society movement generally, and law
and development in particular).
35

The tendency for proposed reforms to resemble familiar U.S. models (usually in
sanitized and idealized form) is clear from a reading of the activist law and development literature. What is not so obvious is that the tendency is difficult to combat.
Merryman, supra note 11, at 480 n.60.
' This is not a claim that either the foundations or AID directed or dictated the
subject of research or scholarship by those they funded. Furthermore, there is no claim
that the source of funding affected the conclusions reached by the researchers. It would
be disingenuous, however, to contend that the source of funding and the agenda of
those funding the research had no bearing on the nature of the scholarship done, the
sort of questions asked, and the issues highlighted by the research. Surely, the availability of funds for certain kinds and methods of research in part dictated scholarly
interest, thereby influencing the willingness of particular scholars to apply for funding.
This in turn affected such considerations as the selection criteria for projects to be
funded. As Professor Merryman observed contemporaneously in a slightly different
context:
The U.S. lawyer often had [extra leverage] because of the real or fancied possibility that
his recommendation would determine whether money would be forthcoming from AID,
Ford, of the ILC for legal education, legal research or other programs for which
financing had been solicited by local authorities.
Merryman, supra note 11, at 480 n.61; see also Galanter & Trubek, supra note 8, at
1089, 1101-02 (explaining the relationship between scholarship and the ability of
scholars to attract the interest of those funding the research); Burg, supra note 11, at
494-96.
37 Comparative legal research and anthropological legal research are distinguished
here. The latter which delved into the existence and content of traditional legal systems
in colonial and pre-colonial Africa was the dominant mode of discourse on African legal studies prior to the emergence of law and development studies. See, e.g., HiDA
KuPER & LEO KUPER, Introduction to AFRICAN LAw 3-5 (Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper
eds., 1965). Law and development, on the other hand, focused on the post-colonial
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for bringing about social change." Their writings were directed at understanding the shortcomings of African law in the context of Western legal
thought, and the advocacy of law reform in the nature of codification and
similar measures for formalizing, institutionalizing, and rendering acceptable local practices within the dominant Western ethos.3 9
In time, many liberal legalists began to question the viability of both
forms of scholarship. They pointed out that these approaches embodied
assumptions and propositions that were questionable, if not erroneous.'
Implicitly and explicitly, both the comparativist and codification approaches conveyed a hierarchical structure of legal systems where traditional
Third World systems, if they were to meet the needs of their societies,
had to evolve or be transformed voluntarily to the supposedly more

development or modernization of African law so that it looked recognizably Western.
3 Professor Friedman somewhat disparagingly has said of this group:
Ignorance about the relationship between law and development is not solely a problem
of law in third world countries. There is monumental ignorance or misunderstanding
about law and development in our own and other modem countries. This reflects the
ignorance, equally deep, about the relationship in general between the legal system and
the social system. The legal missionaries abroad are merely exotic versions of legal
missionaries inside our own country, reforming, arranging, codifying and revamping the
law in a vacuum of theory.
Friedman, On Legal Development, supra note 11, at 13. See also Merryman, supra note
11, at 479-82.
3'See, e.g., Robert B. Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent,
English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 999, 1016; Arthur J. Von
Mehren, Some Observations on the Role of Law in Indian Society and on Indian Legal
Education, 3 JAIAPUR LJ. 13, 16 (1963). Cf. Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2, at
10 (appraising the core conceptions about law and development as the gradual evolution
of Third World states into societies characterized by the market system, the legal
structures, and other cultural attributes found in the advanced industrial nations of the
West).
' In Professor Merryman's view, the work of these law and development scholars
differed from that of traditional comparativists in the sense that traditional comparative
scholars seek to understand the societies they study as hosts, not mere targets of inquiry. They do not seek by juxtaposition to restructure their host societies. See Merryman,
supra note 11, at 475-82; see also Rene David, A Civil Code For Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil Law in African Countries, 37 TuL. L. RE'V. 187
(1962) (discussing codification and resulting problems); VARGA, supra note 33.
[W]hatever else African countries may lack in the way of modem armies, a literate
population, an adequate infrastructure, large capital resources and an experienced cadre
of leaders at all levels, there is one thing they all have which can be as rapidly and
cheaply manufactured as paper money, and which has the same tempting property of
seeming to be available to solve all problems: . . .legislative power.
Anthony Allott, The Unification of Laws in Africa, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 51 (1968) ").
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efficacious and highly developed legal systems of Western countries. 4
Unease with 'these assumptions prompted the third style of scholarship:
the intramural conversation on the nature, character, and purpose of law
and development studies. There were criticisms of specific elements of the
developing field, such as a belief in the superiority of the Western legal
tradition or a belief that tradition can be transplanted wholesale to Africa
or other developing societies.42 The central critique was the near-absence
or underdevelopment of any sense of theory of law, development, or the
relationship of law to development, and, therefore, the contribution that
the emerging field could make to any of the potentially implicated
disciplines of law, development, or the social sciences.43 American law"' Cf. Friedman, Cultural and Social Development, supra note 12, at 45 ("The
movement for modernization of law is the Third World analogy to the law reform

movement in the United States . .

.

. The same kind of legal theory underlies this

movement, and the same skepticism about its results can be voiced.'); Burg, supra note
11, at 503 (observing that "[s]ince virtually all of the law and development writers
were born or at least educated in the West, this ethnocentric tendency is apt to be onesided in its approval of western models.").
4

See, e.g., Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2, at 20-21, 36, 42-46 (discussing

how legal forms are dictated by the political and economic environment, and illustrating
the point by reference to his study of the Brazilian capital market); Friedman, Cultural
and Social Development, supra note 12, at 29 (asserting that law and legal systems are
part of the political, social, and economic environment as are the educational system
and other areas of culture); but see Friedman, On Legal Development, supra note 11,

at 46-48 (suggesting ways in which law can be perversely effective when transferred
from one society to another).
' The seminal articulation of this claim was Galanter & Trubek, supra note 8. See
also Burg, supra note 11, at 502 (arguing that the expansion of the concept of law
beyond the formal legal system is critical to understanding the relationship between law
and development); id.at 517-21 (stating that some view law and development in
instrumentalist terms, others doubt that law plays any role in development whether
defined in terms of economic growth, or socio-political change); but see id. at 525-27
(writings on law and development are characterized by "two psychological" trends: the
desire for clarity and order, on the one hand, and a certain frustration with the limits
inherent in law and the legal profession, on the other). Cf. Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that whatever their differences, law and development theorists
agreed on the possibility of generating general principles of broad applicability that
relate law to economic growth and to political development).
It is distressing, but true, that when the lawyer goes abroad, he sails into a vacuum. He
takes with him nothing that can reasonably be called a careful thought out, explicit
theory of law and society or law and development - nor does he find one at his
destination. Yet the economists, the political scientists and the engineers all agree that,
at least for them, some general theory is vital.

Friedman, On Legal Development, supra note 11, at 12.
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yers by training and experience are doers not theorists. They may function well within the American environment, but nothing in their background or training equips them to engage in the sort of social transformation implicated in the idea of law and development of Third World
societies.' This was especially true given the minimal understanding in
U.S. domestic legal studies of the relationship of law to society.' One
commentator concluded:
I would argue that the law and development movement has been largely
misdirected, and that the subsidence of interest within AID and the
foundations, and among law and development scholars is the result of
more or less tacit recognition that what was going on was ineffectual,
or harmful as technical assistance, and peripheral as scholarship. The
mainstream law and development movement, dominated by the American
legal style was bound to fail, and has failed.'
While these intellectual shortcomings go someway in explaining the
demise of the liberal legalist wing of the law and development movement,
they insufficiently account for it. For example, what explains the failure
of the movement to take up the revivalist strategies put forward some of

44

Action in the arena of law and social change requires some coherent theory or program
that is based on some justifiable assumptions about the probable effects of alternative
courses of action. The American lawyer who engages in social engineering within his
own society (i.e. "domestic law and development"), operates within a familiar environment, employing generally valid but unstated premises that are part of his natural "feel"
for the culture. Consciously or unconsciously, he is restricted by his own background
to a range of proposals that shared experience tells him have a reasonable prospect of
succeeding without disproportionate social costs. The proposals he does make will be
critically evaluated by his peers and by a variety of responsible individuals and agencies
and may not survive that evaluation (or may be significantly changed by it). Eventually,
if the action program is adopted and put into practice it would be in the proponent's
own society;, he and the people with whom he most closely relates will observe its
results and experience its consequences. But in Third World law and development programs, the American actor has neither a reliable "feel" for the local situation nor an
explicit theory of law and social change on which to base his proposals. His only
recourse is to project what is familiar to him unto the foreign context. There his status
as "expert," the implied superiority of foreign "developed" over domestic "underdeveloped" expertise, and other factors give the proposals privileged status, an opportunity for
lateral entry at the top without the disciplining need to work the way up through the
community of scholars or through society either in the U.S. or in the "target" nation.

Merryman, supra note 11, at 480 (citations omitted).
' See Friedman, Cultural and Social Development, supra note 12, at 39-40; Friedman, On Legal Development, supra note 11, at 13; Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra
note 2, at 36-38.
' Merryman, supra note 11, at 481.
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its members?47 Two additional factors were significant for the disintegration of the movement and for the revival of interest in law and development studies in the 1990s.
Law and development studies needed the tacit support of the Third
World elite to flourish. Like their Western counterparts, the elite viewed
law in very instrumental terms. They shared the desire for the modemization of law and legal institutions such as the administrative and judicial
machinery of the state, but they also articulated two other fundamental
purposes for law: its unification and its Africanization. 4 Modem law's
stress on the centralization or unity of the instruments of power and the
elevation of the modem sector accorded with the interests of this
group.' In unification, they expressed a desire to do away with the
dualistic legal regime that had emerged in colonial times by the integration of traditional, local, or customary practices with the law left behind
by the colonial rulers. 50 This reflected a belief that the result would be
' See, e.g., Galanter & Trubek, supra note 8, at 1099-1100 (arguing for an eclectic
approach that retains a commitment to Third World development while being critical
of governments); Burg, supra note 11, at 528-30 (suggesting the viability of the
coexistence 6f diverse approaches); Merryman, supra note 11, at 468-74 (contending for
a scholarly tradition of interdisciplinary studies that emphasizes the role of theory
formation and inquiry over prescription and action).
See Anthony N. Allott, The Future of Law, in AFRICAN LAW, supra note 37, at

216, 223.
Cf.Friedman, On Legal Development, supra note 11, at 47.
A new code, from France or Switzerland, with new and different propositions of law
may demand skills totally different from those of local chiefs or elders, whose authority

depended on their knowledge of the ways of the people. If successfully imposed on the
countryside, the new code can drive the elders or chiefs out of power unless they learn
to adapt or circumvent. If they cannot, a new group of officials rises to power, riding
on the crest of their knowledge and their foreign education.
Id. (citations omitted).
o See Allott, supra note 48, at 223-27. The existence of dualistic or parallel legal
regimes in colonial African societies was in part the result of explicit policy decisions
by the colonial rulers to exercise control through indirect rule, under which native institutions and power structures continued to direct the day-to-day life of Africans, while
non-Africans were governed by the substantive and procedural laws applied in the
mother country. See CRAWFORD YOUNG, TiM AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERsPEcTvE 107-17 (1994). It was also in part a reflection of the staged process
of colonization. The uneven process by which the extent of colonial control depended
on the ability of the colonizer to extract revenues with which to build and maintain
colonial institutions meant that the levels of the supplantation of traditional legal
institutions varied from one locality to another. Post-colonial efforts to unify law and
legal institutions are direct elements of the overall process of nation-building, literally
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the emergence of African Law, law that in its benign incarnation would
reflect the experiences and aspirations of African societies and the African
people.
By the mid-1970s, however, proponents of the modernizing philosophy had become suspicious of one another. The Third World elites,
confident of the efficacy in domestic matters of rule by fiat, had become
self-assured to take on the power structures of the developed countries in
the international arena, while liberal legalists had begun to doubt that
their alliance with those elites would mature into the creation of liberal
or legally circumscribed power structures within the Third World." They
viewed with dismay and ultimate resignation as African elites focused on
and employed the modernization of legal and bureaucratic institutions to
overwhelm the modernization of legal ideology, and transformed the quest
for the unification and Africanization of law into instruments of internal
repression and xenophobic rhetoric.
Finally, the liberal legalist wing collapsed when a variety of related
domestic crises in the United States shook the confidence of scholars and
funding agencies as to the value of studying law and development in
foreign countries. The failings of the Vietnam War - notably the incapacity of the United States to nurture successfully South Vietnam as a
liberal beacon in the jungles of Southeast Asia and the lack of veracity
of official U.S. government pronouncements relating to the war Watergate, and the revelations of the ensuing congressional investigations,
undercut the moral underpinnings of the liberal legalists' crusade. These
factors assured that funding for external interventionism from the establishment sources disappeared,52 and what funding remained was redirected to domestic concerns. The bright lights of the liberal legalist
wing continued their academic research and interests in the emerging
domestic movements of critical legal studies, which like law and development, focused on the relationship between law and society in general, and
law and politics in particular.

and figuratively.
"' See Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2, at 23 ("We struggled nobly, but our
efforts were disappointing. Some Third World lawyers took our money but rejected our
lessons. Others accepted the message that law should become more instrumental, but
saw no reason why it should also be liberal: they became willing technocratic servants
of despotic regimes.")
32

See Burg, supra note 11, at 496, 496 n.17. Cf. Galanter & Trubek, supra note

8, at 1101-02 (outlining other factors of law and development scholarship).
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C. Law and Development as Pragmatic Intercourse Among Nations
Academic disciplines rarely disappear, at least within the life-span of
the founders. Yet, it is virtually a given that the disciplines undergo
fundamental changes. By the late 1970s, what passed for law and development in American universities was demonstrably different and distinct
from what had preceded. Much like the scholarship that preceded it, the
sort of inquiry fostered by the new law and development field was
predominantly a direct product of the changed environment in the interstate relations between the industrialized and the less-developed countries. The change in the tenor of law and development scholarship
reflected the transformation of that relationship from that of new fledgling
babes in need of and willing to accept succor, to that of overgrown, selfassertive adolescents.
The withdrawal of institutional support by AID and the private
foundations shifted the continued funding of law and development studies
to the academic institutions with pre-existing commitments to law and
development scholars. That burden, to some extent, was eased by two
concurrent developments. First, for sociological, economic, and technological reasons, decolonization, far from slowing down the tendency of Third
World elites and their children to seek higher education at institutions in
the industrialized world and especially the United States, accelerated it.
U.S. institutions, responsive to the particularized needs of the influx,
created or expanded programs dealing with development issues. Law and
development studies provided a good fit for the niche.
Second, the decolonized states, working in concert with other predominantly nonindustrialized or non-Communist states in various international consortia,53 radically transformed the rhetoric of the terms of
discourse in international relations and international law. 4 Moreover, that
3 Notable among these were such groupings as the nonaligned movement, the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Asia, Caribbean
and Pacific forum (ACP), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
54 See Peter Slinn, Differing Approaches to the Relationship Between International
Law and Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PER-

27, 27-35 (1987). A contentious output of this rhetoric revolved around the
question of whether an international law of development exists. Proponents argued that
international law requires industrialized states to promote the development of lessdeveloped countries (LDCs) by granting LDC exports preferential access to industrialized country domestic markets and to technology, stabilization of LDC export earnings,
a freer hand in LDC determination of the propriety and level of state control over
LDC resources, and appropriate levels of compensation for nationalized or expropriated
sPECnvEs
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rhetorical feistiness was sometimes accompanied by deeds that directly
challenged the established order, as was the case with well-publicized
incidents of the expropriation or nationalization of Western-owned or
controlled property in developing economies, 5 gave credence to the
perception of a restructured world order. The discourse of "peace and
security," "collective security," and "anarchy and realism" were being
supplanted by claims for "a development decade," "permanent sovereignty
over natural resources," "international equity," "interdependence," and "a
new international economic order. 5 6 The issue of Third World development was no longer tangential to international law and relations, but
rather directly implicated the well-being of developed societies. Portentous
events such as the 1973-1974 oil shocks manipulated by members of
OPEC, coupled with the Chilean and Libyan expropriations of Western
companies engaged in the extraction of mineral resources made this point
beyond dispute.
These forces shaped the direction and content of law and development studies in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s. Issues of the
progressive codification of domestic law in African states and the efficient
administration of justice in those societies gave way to studies on the
treatment of foreign investment, the development of an international code
for multinational corporations, and the appropriate mix between regulatory
fiat and economic incentives. Comparative studies of law in action versus
law on the books hitherto conducted with reference to land-tenure and
customary law began to be studied in the context of the grant of extractive product concessions, tourism, and problems of corruption in international business transactions.57 In short, law and development studies, far

property with higher levels of financial and technical assistance provided by industrialized countries to LDCs as foreign aid. See, e.g., CHARLES CHUKWUMA OKOLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPEcTiVES OF THE DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES 78-79 (1978) (contrasting the procedural preferences of the developed' countries at the U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, representing one-third of the votes and two-thirds of world
trade, with less-developed countries representing two-thirds of the vote and less than
one-third of world trade).
" See generally Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriationas an Attempt to Control Foreign
Firms in LDC: Trends from 1960 to 1979, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 329 (1984) (analyzing
expropriations in 79 LDCs from 1960 to 1979).
' See generally ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 23-37 (1977) (articulating an alternative theory to realist based responses of the
Western liberal democracies).
' See, e.g., Michael W. Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations: The Governance
of MultinationalEnterprises by Third World Nations, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
301, 303 (1984).
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from being about law and society, became no more than an appendage of
courses on international transactions.
The nature of the scholarship in the area similarly underwent considerable change. In the first place, there was a paucity of scholarship since
much of the curriculum was devoted to teaching "how it is done," rather
than "how it might or ought to be done." What little writing that occurred naturally reflected the curricula interests in the law of international
investments in less-developed countries, and they were just as likely to be
written by practitioners for practitioners in practitioner-oriented journals as

by scholars in scholarly journals. 58 One might reasonably ask whether it

5' See James T. Haight, History of the Section of International Law and Practice
1913-1993: Section History 1974-75, 28 INT'L LAW. 587, 615 (1994); DOING BusINEss
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Peter W. Schroth ed., 1993) Although somewhat more
scholarly articles typically appeared in the American Bar Association's International
Lawyer or in student-run international law journals, the emphasis of these articles were
practice-oriented, and tended to focus on the particular business environment of specific
African countries, usually the larger economies like Nigeria and Egypt, whose markets,
abundance of natural resources, or political location appeared to have cachet for U.S.
investors. See, e.g., J.W. Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment: A Framework for Economic Openness, 9 INT'L LAW. 647 (1975); Adly Abdel-Meguid, Egypt's
Policy Towards Foreign Investment, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97 (1977); G.E.
Nazer, The Legal Framework of Foreign Investment in Egypt, 11 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 613 (1979); J. Gregory Bishop, Closing the Open Door: Reappraisal of
Foreign Investment in Egypt, 1985 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 537 (1985); Bernard
Blankenheimer, The Foreign Investment Climate in Nigeria, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 589 (1977); Jerome F. Donovan, Nigeria: Still Safe for U.S. Investors?, 10 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601 (1977); Allen P.K. Keesee, Secured Lending in Nigeria, 15
INT'L L. 25 (1981); Niki Tobi, Note, The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 543 (1981); D.K. Hill, Transfer of Technology From U.S. to Nigeria: A Balancing of Legal Interests, 6 Tx. S.U.L. REv. 380 (1979); Richard J.
Faletti, Investing in Nigeria-The Law, Good Intentions, Illusion and Substance, 5 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 743 (1983); Sabinus Akusobi Megwa, The Foreign Direct Investment Climate in Nigeria: The Changing Law and Development Policies, 21 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1983); M.A. Haroun & T.O. Rose, Outline-Guide to Agreements
For Development Projects in Algeria, 11 INT'L L. 681 (1977); Duane E. Sams, The
Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Cameroon, 17 INT'L L. 489 (1983); Michael Robert
Tyler, Legal Aspects of Investing in Ghana, 7 LoY. OF L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 165
(1984); Muna Ndulo, The Requirement of Domestic Participation in New Mining
Ventures in Zambia, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 579, 579 (1977).
There were articles reviewing trends in Africa or the developing world, but these
focused predominantly on issueg of practical relevance for the outsider wishing to invest
in those economies, rather than in exploring the internal dynamics of development,
economic growth, or political participation. See, e.g., S. Azadon Tiewol & Francis A.
Tsegah, Arbitration and the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selective Survey of
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is accurate to classify these courses and scholarship as part of the law
and development movement. The answer is in the affirmative because like
legalists, they presented more in terms of the modernization or development of Third World societies. The myopic focus of the process of that
development on external or international economic relations was no more
the fault of U.S. scholars than it was of the emerging politicians, bureaucrats, and other technocratic elites of the Third World. The scholastic focus on international economic law mirrored the emerging trend of Third
World countries to look for development not in the internal processes of
their societies, but primarily in external relations. Again, scholarship could
only follow; it did not lead development.
When in the 1980s Third World countries were reduced to marginal
players in international economic relations and their internal processes for
generating development were destroyed, law and development studies
similarly withered. This occurrence is explored in Part II. Before doing
so, however, a third strand of law and development studies - admittedly
one that was not extensively explored - is sketched.
D. Law, Underdevelopment, and Dependency
At about the same time liberal legalists gained a foothold in academic circles, theories of underdevelopment and dependency swept
through the social sciences. Although varied in their analytical and
structural emphasis," these theorists, though not necessarily adherents of

African Practice, 24 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 393 (1975); Leslie L. Rood, Compensation for
Takeovers in Africa, 11 J. INT'L & ECON. 521 (1977); Lyman H. Heine, Impasse and
Accommodation: The Protection of Private Direct Foreign Investment in the Developing
States, 14 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 465 (1982); T.H. Reynolds, Clouds of Codes: The
New International Economic Order Through Codes of Conduct - A Survey, 75 L.
LIBR. J. 315 (1982); The World Bank's New Co-Financing Initiatives: Legal Mechanisms for Promoting Commercial Lending to Developing Countries, 15 L. & POL. INT'L
Bus. 911 (1983).
The nature of these articles should be contrasted with those of the liberal legalists
cited above, which, whatever their shortcomings, explored the nature of development
and its relationship to macro structures and ideas such as modernity, capitalism, the
market, government, bureaucracies, and the state.
59

Theories of underdevelopment and dependency, considered as a whole, are eclectic in
nature .... The coexistence of profoundly different currents of thought further suggests
that ideas of underdevelopment and dependency are described more accurately as an
approach or a framework than as a theory.
Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 L.
& Soc'y REv. 723, 747 (1980) (citations omitted).
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Marx but with a significant number coming from developing societies,"
found in Marxist theory a useful starting baseline for evaluating the
contemporary position of less-developed countries within the global
capitalist system. As in Marxist-Leninist analysis, these theories painted
a holistic portrait of global interactions and sought to draw attention to
the parallel relationships over time between the modes of domination
within and among societies, and the methods and patterns of global
historical and economic exchanges."
The post-World War II period,. they suggested, was neither unique
nor particularly enlightened, but only a phase of human history readily
intelligible in the context of broader economic and historical movements.
The task faced by underdevelopment and dependency scholars was how
to explain and account for the persistent and indeed widening inequalities
between the societies of the South and the industrialized countries of the
West. Lenin's imperialism theory may have sufficed for the colonial
period, but it offered an incomplete explanation for the continuing worsening of the relationship to the detriment of the South in the post-colonial
period.' In particular, the theory which had focused on the role of the
colonizing state and its propertied class to appropriate the surplus of
capital and labor from the colonized state provided insufficient explanatory force for the declining terms of trade and the continued capital outflow
from the sovereign and independent states of Latin America, Asia, and
Africa to Western Europe and North America.

6
61

See id. at 737.
See IMMANUEL WALRSTEN,

THE CAPrrAIsT WORLD ECONOMY 152-64 (1979).

While many underdevelopment and dependency theorists do not necessarily subscribe to
the specifics of Wallerstein's world systems approach, it is accurate to state that mainstream theorists of underdevelopment and dependency shared at least in outline the
attributes described in the text (1) a holistic view of society; (2) underpinned by
economic forces; (3) shaped by global events; (4) internally and externally responsive
to those events; (5) through structural definition and redefinition of all spheres of life:
social, political, cultural, and economic. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that
this approach was cautioned against by some sympathetic scholars of underdevelopment
theory as Colin Leys, who in 1975, perceptively wrote:
[U]nderdevelopment theory is, or should be, precisely a theory of their [fTird World.
countries] history, a theory of the contradictions in the development of their modes and
relations of production under colonialism and imperialism, contradictions which are ex-

pressed today in the growing polarization of these countries between authoritarianism, on
the one hand, and revolution on the other.

COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPmENT IN KENYA 7-8 (1975).
' See, e.g., LENIN, supra note 16.
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The initial attempt to develop an explanation was undertaken by the
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under the auspices of Raoul Prebisch.' 3 ECLA explained the deteriorating conditions of
Latin American economies in terms of nationalistic barriers to Latin
American exports by the industrialized societies," the lack of sustained
economic planning in Latin American economies, and the absence of adequate official intervention in domestic economies.' The result was
continued reliance on the export of primary products to assure an everwidening gap between the welfare of Latin American countries and the
prosperity of industrialized nations.' Armed with this analysis, ECLA
advocated self-help through import substitution policies in the industrial
sector sustained by high tariff barriers and domestic incentives to selective
and favored local industries.67
The analysis and the prescriptions found favor not only with the
intended Latin American audience, but also with the newly independent
countries of Africa and Asia. With their numerical dominance in the U.N.
General Assembly, these states of the South spearheaded the creation of
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the
U.N. Center for Transnational Enterprises (UNCTNE), both of which
played dominant roles in the regime of pragmatic internationalism for
confronting issues of development in the 1970s.'
For underdevelopment and dependency theorists, ECLA's analysis of
the problem was insufficiently radical, and its prescriptions were doomed
to fail because they would not solve the specific problem of interstate
inequalities and because they were bound to generate internal forces that
would exacerbate the distortions already at work within the dependent
state. Simply put, ECLA's analysis failed to account for the breadth of
the systemic characteristics of the problem.
While scholars of underdevelopment and dependency theories differed
in their emphasis on the nature and scope of the systemic problem,'

6 See U.N. DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN
AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPLE PROBLEMS, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 12/89, U.N. Sales

No. 1950.II.G.2 (1950).
6 See id. at 16-17.
6 See id. at 17-18.
' See id.
67 See id. at 45-48.
6' See Okolie, supra note 54, at 29. For a brief account of the formation of

UNCTAD and its role in the development of the new international economic order, see
Robert S. Browne, Delinkage - Response of a Spurned Lover or a Rational Path for
Africa? 27 How. L.J. 937 (1984).
9 There is disagreement regarding the scope and nature of the causal relationship
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they shared a willingness to engage in a radical appraisal of the internal
structures of the societies in developing countries and to relate those

structures to the international capitalist system.70 Some scholars, for
example, challenged modernization's contention that developing societies
would become developed by following prescribed social and economic
policies. Central to the argument of such scholars was the assessment that

the internal structures of developing countries were fundamentally different from those of developed societies. The problem was not simply that

economic and social institutions in the peripheral countries were not
modern, inefficient, or underdeveloped, but rather that these societies were

characterized by non-autonomous dualistic structures where the economic
and social institutions were geared to meet the demands of developed
societies rather than the needs of the developing societies. The conse-

quence of decolonization was to further aggravate the internal dualism by
severing political control from social and economic domination. Incapable

of autonomously exercising control over their societies, dependent countries could not expect to graduate en masse into the status of developed
capitalist societies. Any attempt to use the instruments of state power in

between exploitation, capital accumulation, and underdevelopment. Some underdevelopment theorists contend that the world capitalist system created underdevelopment not
because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because the exploitation was not
sufficiently far-reaching to uproot vestigial, feudal, or traditional obstacles to the new
forms of capital accumulation. A more thorough exploitation, affirmative proponents of
the theory contend, would have resulted in the complete destruction of the pre-capitalist
modes of production that would then have had to be replaced by indigenous regimes
for capital accumulation. Other scholars contend that persisting underdevelopment is
essential to the global capitalist system, hence the failure to fully destroy pre-capitalist
modes of production was not an oversight, but an essential element for the creation of
unequal international specialization of production. See Snyder, supra note 59, at 753-54.
A third view is simply descriptive, asserting that "[t]he situation of underdevelopment
came about when commercial capitalism and then industrial capitalism expanded and
linked to the world market nonindustrial economies that went on to occupy different
positions in the overall structure of the capitalist system." FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO & ENzo FALErTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 17
(1979).
' See Snyder, supra note 59, at 751-52; SAMm AMIN, IMPBRAUSM AND UNEQUAL
DEvELOPmENT 110-16 (1977) (arguing that (1) there is a world capitalist system that
functions through the international specialization of labor and relations of exchange; (2)
international specialization exhibits a hierarchic structure of heterogenous modes of
production and uneven productivity; (3) linkages within the global system are such that
modes of production in developing countries are geared to function in tandem with the
needs of sectors in the developed countries, rather than with each other, (4) these
linkages are products of political domination and unequal exchange between the center
and the periphery or dependent states).
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an underdeveloped society would be checked both internally and externally. From without the state, only those policies consonant with the satisfaction of the demands of the global system would be tolerable to the
decision-makers, while from within the state, the absence of linkages
assured that any conceptual unity in the rationalization of the modes of
production internally would create friction between and among atomized
local interests. State power would be deployed to serve the particularized
claims of those with access to it rather than to serve any general national
interests.
The dynamic of economic and political life in underdeveloped
countries is that these countries appear fragmented and irrational when
viewed in nationalistic terms, but rational and intelligible when juxtaposed
by global capitalist needs and structures. The state was thus an article for
study within the scholarship of proponents of dependency and underdevelopment theories. Unlike their liberal modernization colleagues, these
radical critics of the status quo did not take the state in underdeveloped
and dependent societies as a given. They viewed it as one of several
players within the global capital system. The state functioned as an instrument and an expression of power relationships within the international
capital system. As such, the state was subject to alteration and to the particular needs of specific participants. For example, in the context of
immediate post-colonial Africa, dependency theorists' assessments varied
regarding the nature of the African state and its place in African society
and the international capitalist system in the period immediately following
decolonization. Some contended that the state was underdeveloped; others
asserted it to be overdeveloped. Those who claimed the African state to
be underdeveloped had as their paradigm of the fundamental role of the
state, the extraction of resources from individuals and segments of a
society, and the accumulation or distribution of such resources for the
general welfare. Typically, this function is performed through the legislative and administrative structures of the state.7 They claimed that in the
post-colonial African state, it was not only that political structures such
as party politics and national political movements were weak, but also
that the institutionalized regulatory mechanisms through which the administrative state ordinarily functions including revenue raising, licensing,
policing, health delivery, and labor force development and control are
poorly developed. While some dependency theorists attributed this underdevelopment to the subservient status of periphery states in the capitalist
system, others explained it in terms of the suddenness of the decolonization process. In either case, state power in African societies was captured
not by entrepreneurial bourgeois capitalists and members of the learned

"'

See

THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 29 (1979).
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professions, but by the petty bourgeois and middle class professionals
who proceeded to over bureaucratize it to serve their aspirations for
upward social and economic mobility.
Proponents of the over-developed state, invoking essentially the same
data, argued that the competing but reconcilable interests of the propertied
classes in the post-colonial African state are in equipoise. Consequently,
the state is able to play a mediating role among them by preserving
private property and the capitalist mode of production, which embodies
all three interests.72 This mediating role is a preeminent function of the
state in the colonial period, a preeminence attained by superimposing on
undeveloped colonial societies the superstructure of the state as it existed
in the metropolitan colonial country, and then giving the colonial state the
added task of taming the indigenous colonized peoples and structures to
render them amenable to subjugation and domination by the metropolitan
propertied and ruling classes. For a variety of reasons, both functions of
the state continued after decolonization7 3 Thus, the post-colonial African
state was overdeveloped in the sense that it was charged with tasks
atypical of the state as understood in the developed capitalist countries.
The proponents of the overdeveloped African state contended that the
state should be seen not only as the means for collective security against
other states and the resolution of intragroup conflicts within its boundaries, but also as an explicit forum for social struggle and the repression
of disempowered groups.74
Whether viewed as underdeveloped or overdeveloped, the dependency
and underdevelopment scholars agreed that the African state was also a
weak state.75 Its dual role as the transmitter of the demands of the international capitalist system on the peripheral peoples of the formerly colonized world and of the intergroup conflicts within these societies posed
difficult challenges poorly met by its relatively undeveloped administrative

See Snyder, supra note 59, at 767-69.
Cf id. at 771 (articulating the mediating function of the state as applied among
the classes within the state, and between the state itself and outside forces).
" Dependency theorists differ as to whether the additional functions of the state in
the colonized countries grew out of the desire to subjugate indigenous social classes,
or from the "need to subordinate pre-capitalist. . . social formations to the imperatives
of colonial capitalism." John S. Saul, The State in Post Colonial Society: Tanzania, in
THE SocIALTsr REGIsTER 1974, at 351, 353 (Ralph A. Miliband & John Saville eds.,

1974) (citations omitted).
' Although dependency theorists have long contended that peripheral post-colonial
societies are composed of weak states, it is now an idea that commands acceptance

among conventional liberal scholars. See, e.g.,
31 (1990); APrER, supra note 23, at 55.

ROBERT
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and political infrastructure. Faced with the competing claims of the international system for efficient regulation of economic production and capital
accumulation, and internal demands for distributive justice and social
welfare, the state machinery veered from one extreme to another, losing
in the process any semblance of a coherent ideology or the physical
capacity to support a civil society. Not surprisingly, access to state power
was achieved by a variety of means ranging from popular mobilization to
military insurgencies. None of these, however, assured continuity or
certainty, but rather seemed to reflect transitional victories, contingent as
much on external as on internal alliances of economic and social interests.
If politics, the economy, and society all depict this phenomenon of
internal segmentation and subservience to external structural needs, can
law and the development of legal institutions be any different? Given the
central role of the state in theories of law and development, the answer
would seem to be a resounding no. Yet, the connection of law to underdevelopment and dependency theories has never been fully flushed out.76
While it might be interesting to speculate on the reasons for this omission, such a project is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is
not difficult to sketch some claims that could be made by a proponent of
dependency or underdevelopment theory on the role of law in underdeveloped societies. 7
Structuralist proponents of dependency theory view law as the formal
institutionalization or articulation of the internally noncohesive society and
the externally unequal relationship of the underdeveloped societies to the
industrialized capitalist states. Law is the expression of deeply embedded
patterns of the distribution of power within and without the state, and it
provides the facial rationale for the structuring of these relationships.
A legal regime's purpose, under these circumstances, is both descriptive and ideological. The function of law is to provide an internal coherence for a system of dialectical relationships. The specific provisions of
laws themselves are less important than the internal consistency of the
76

See Snyder, supra note 59, at 775-79.

7 Theories of dependency and underdevelopment exhibit the classic left-of-center
syndrome of elegantly formulated, thoroughgoing, and perceptive criticism of the status
quo while simultaneously refraining from offering implementable solutions.
To the dismay of [Latin American] leftists, [Hernando] de Soto has wrested the debate
over development in Latin America away from them by focusing attention on what he
believes are the actual aspirations of the economically marginalized. De Soto, thus, is
able to reject leftist analyses that blame Latin America's economic problems on multinational corporations and the local capitalists who deal with them.
Jane Kaufman Winn, How to Make Poor Countries Rich and How to Enrich Our Poor,
77 IowA L. REv. 899, 901 (1992) (reviewing HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH
(1986)).
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logical expression of ideologies that, in the absence of this function,
would be in tension if not outright conflict. The legal legitimation of
institutions such as the corporation, the market, indigenization, parastatals,
and the like, act to put outside the boundaries of debate dominant power
relationships, and thereby maintain the equilibrium of the international
capitalist system.
Alternatively, law may be viewed in instrumentalist terms. Law
functions to promote and perpetuate pre-existing power relationships, and
to assure the continued viability of the rationalized systems of production
and distribution that undergird the global capitalist system. Statutory
enactments such as those relating to taxation, employment, foreign
investment, and intellectual property can be understood in these terms.78
Law, as the exercise of state power, creates value by motivating some
and denuding others of the resources and capacity to challenge preexisting distributive relationships. Law functions by assuring that different
elements of society make their own unique contributions to the international division or specialization of roles within the capitalist framework.
In either case, understanding law requires going beyond national
formalism and past positivistic statements of the law. Law should be
viewed in terms of social structures and economic conflict among classes
within both the national state and at the global level. It describes, prescribes, and masks the ever-present battle for distributive justice among
these classes. The division among these classes cuts across national
boundaries, even if the formal articulation of dominant rules is framed by
and is consonant with national frontiers.
Central to any view of law within the dependency and underdevelopment regime, then, is the question of the nature and relevance of the state
to the formulation of socio-economic and political interests, and the extent
to which law, as the embodiment of the state, is an autonomous expression of those interests.79 These issues are at best moot in the context of

Cf. CARDOSO & FA= O, supra note 69, at 154-55 (explaining the structural
requirements for the power base in a developmentalist state).
' See Snyder, supra note 59, at 762-65. A broadly accepted interpretation is
Wallerstein's claim that the state is a "disguised instrument of foreign control."
WALLERSTEIN, supra note 61, at 228-29. See PETER EvANS, DEPENDENT DEvELOPMENr
THE ALLiANCE OF MULTINATIONAL STATE AND LOCAL CAPrrAL IN BRAZIL 9-12 (1979)
(contending that the state functions in alliance with local and foreign capital to promote
capital accumulation on an international basis). Some theorists, while accepting the
transnational character of class structures, nonetheless maintain that the state itself
generates uniquely national classes that may be autonomous and independent of external
class demands. For example, military dictatorships may serve national capitalist
development, with beneficiaries being a nationalist bourgeoisie independent from trans-
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the liberal legalist and pragmatic internationalist conceptions of law and
development. Law may be used by the powerful and independent foreign
participants in the international capitalist system to shape and control the
behavior and reactions of dependent classes and groups in underdeveloped
societies." Alternatively, law may be used by the national bourgeoisie in
dependent societies with the tacit and technical support of the international bourgeoisie to extract surplus capital from and otherwise subjugate
the local petty bourgeois and similarly dependent groups.
Finally, law may function as a source of power for the local bourgeoisie in its relationship with international capital. By controlling the
levers of the state, the local bourgeoisie may employ law to appropriate
to itself a greater portion of capitalist production than it would receive
otherwise. It does so by invoking nationalism as a potent political and
economic force to be reckoned with, one that must be mollified through
such processes as indigenization or nationalization requiring ownership
and control of certain sectors of the economy, one that must be withdrawn from the international sector and ceded to disgruntled domestic
classes. The beneficiaries of such policies are the indigenously wealthy
and powerful who are already allied to and depend on international
capital for the resources to acquire the nationalized assets.
There is little doubt that examples abound to provide ample support
for all three views of the use of law. It is, however, the third that has
raised the most controversy; doubtless its themes transcend the radical
criticism of dependency theorists and intersect with some concerns of
liberal legalists."' Are state technocrats, indigenous business people, and
professional classes, simply compradors that mediate between national interests and international capital, or do they represent an autonomous
group of actors with identifiable interests in opposition to international
capital? In other words, do dependent countries have identifiable national
interests, are they only of the particularized interests of subgroups that

national capital. Yet others contend that the state, by engaging in joint ventures with
multinational corporations "embodies an alliance between the interests of the internationalized sector of the [national] bourgeoisie, and those of public and entrepreneurial
bureaucracies." CARDOSO & FALETrO supra note 69, at 210. For an interesting
exploration of the interplay of internal and external factors in shaping economic trends
such as privatization in Latin America and Southeast Asia, see Amy L. Chua, The
Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in
Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995).
'0 See generally BENJAMIN COHEN, THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM 190 (1975)
(explaining dependence).
"1 See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 59, at 765-68 (discussing in the African context
whether laws have been adapted to serve the particular needs of the petty bourgeoisie).
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happen to share geographical proximity?'

Is state authority exerted

through law employed to create and rationalize national interests (i.e., to
render underdeveloped countries not merely geographical but also political
expressions), or is such authority deployed to extend the reach of interna-

tional capital by the internal redistribution of power and resources to the
modem sector? Specifically, what is the causal linkage between law and
the shaping of society in dependent and underdeveloped countries?
Dependency and underdevelopment theories offer possibilities but no
explicitly formulated answers. Yet, some insights provided by these
theories have continuing resonance for the contemporary study of law and
development in Sub-Saharan Africa." That relevance is better understood
against the background of the historical forces that have shaped the return
of law and development as an appropriate field of intellectual and politi-

cal concern.
II.

THE RENAISSANCE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

A. The Lost Decade
The decade of the 1980s was uniformly disastrous for African
countries. Without exception, economic performance during the decade
was comparatively worse than that in other regions of the world."
Furthermore, most African countries saw absolute declines in economic
indicators such as annual GDP, rate of growth, per capita income, capital
investments, and agricultural output." The widely reported famines in the

' Cf. APTER, supra note 23, at 18-19 (discussing this issue in terms of political development); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR
REVOLUTION 7-9 (1969) (arguing in economic terms).
' See APTER, supra note 23, at 29 (observing that radical dependency theory
corrected the bland and benign liberal tendencies of modernization theory which could
suggest what went wrong in Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere, but does not assist in the
description of societal impulses towards redemocratization).
4 Cf. SAMMY ADELMAN & ABDUL PAUaWALA, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
THIRD WORLD 1 (1993).
See, e.g., Stalking Africa's Fledgling Stockraarkets, ECONOMIST, June 11, 1994,
at 69 (stating that Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where the population was worse off in absolute terms at the end of the 1980s than it was at the
beginning).
' See WORLD BANK SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRisis TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 1 (1989) [hereinafter SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA] ("Africans today are almost as
poor as they were thirty years ago"); see also Timothy M. Shaw, Revisionism in
African Political Economy in the 1990s, in BEYOND STRUCrURAL ADJUSTMENT IN
AFRICA 49 (Nyang Oro & Timothy M. Shaw eds., 1993) (citing stark economic,
human, and political conditions of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Africa).
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Sahel, the Horn, and Southern Africa were illustrative of a pervasive
problem. Hitherto touted economic success stories such as Kenya and the
Ivory Coast faltered. It became commonplace to compare the gross output

of a continent of 600 million people with that of the tiny European
Kingdom of Belgium (with one-fiftieth of its population),'

with seriousness "can Africa survive?"88

and to ask

The maladies of the 1980s were not solely economic. Military men
vied with one another to set records for the most junior or youngest
uniformed officer to ascend to power. Personal rule, whether of the
youthful military dictator or of the gerontocratic decolonizer, was the sole
institutionalized and predictable element of African politics. 9
Yet, the decade of the 1980s began promisingly. In April 1980, a

newly elected civil government in Nigeria convened a continent-wide
meeting to plan a strategy for continent-wide growth to the year 2000.
Reflecting on the disappointments of prior decades, the politicians gathered in Lagos determined that the Continent's future growth demanded a
reorientation from external dependence to self-reliance. In adopting the
"Lagos Plan of Action," they articulated a vision of continent-wide
cooperation leading to a common market,9' while deep-sixing the colo-

According to Klitgaard, between 1980-1987, real personal income in Africa dropped
by 20%, capital investment per capita fell by 50%, the continent's terms of trade vis-Avis the rest of the world fell by a third, its exports by a half, and by 1988, 47% of
export earnings were being used to service the continent's astronomic foreign debt. See
KLITGAARD, supra note 4, at 7.
'7 See SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA, supra note 86, at 2; see also Stalking Africa's
Fledgling Stockmarkets, supra note 85, at 70.
s JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITACKER, How CAN AFRICA SuRvivE? 232 (1988)
(surveying Africa's many problems and concluding that solutions, if possible, will be
"difficult, messy, and protracted"). Robert Kaplan's eye-catching apocalyptic (albeit
poorly substantiated) diagnosis typified the picture generally presented to the mass
audience. See Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying The Social Fabric of Our Planet,
ATLANTIC, Feb. 1994, at 44. For a thoughtful rebuttal, see Charles W. Maynes, The
New Pessimism: On the World's Future, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept. 1995, at 32.
89 See, e.g., J. Gus Webnow, The Military Factor in African Politics: A Twenty-Five
Year Perspective, in AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE (Gwendolyn M. Carter & Patrick O'Meara
eds., 1985).
9o THE UNrrED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA/ORGANIZATION

OF

AFRICAN UNITY THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE CoMPREHENSIvE DEVELOPMENT

1980-2000 (Addis Ababa ed., 1980). For additional background on the
Lagos Plan, see Browne, supra note 68, at 941, 944-51.
91 See Robert J. Cummings, A Historical Perspective on the Lagos Plan of Action,
in BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 86, at 29, 29-30; see also Oladele
OF AFRICA,
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nial patterns of engagement which they viewed as responsible for Africa's
chronic underdevelopment.
The Plan, however, was not much more than the standard
communiqu6, expressive of aspirations but devoid of means of implementation. Juxtaposed to the Plan was a report issued by the World Bank
in 1981; a document that was to be as instrumental for developments in
Africa during the decade of the 1980s as the Plan was to be irrelevant.'
Bearing the especial imprimatur of Elliott Burg, a development economist
who had been associated with the liberal legalist school of law and
development, the Burg Report, unlike the Lagos Plan, diagnosed African
ills in the post-colonial policies of African governments which resulted in
the misallocation of factors of production. Such policies as poorly managed import substitution programs, price-controls on agricultural products,
poorly devised nationalization of industries, and the maintenance of overinflated exchange rates were more responsible for Africa's economic
underperformance than were external factors. The Burg Report saw the
future for African development in the harnessing and reorientation of
internal resources. The critical resources were, however, those of nationstates viewed as individual political entities, not the pipe-dream of continent-wide integration.
Ultimately, the brutal realism of the Burg Report proved to be more
with the facts on the ground on the 1980s than did the
consonance
in
romanticism of the Lagos Plan. Dramatic change in the hitherto stable
and seemingly successful post-World War II international capitalist system
had been heralded by the first oil-shock of 1974-1976.' Despite the
seemingly bellicose rhetoric of Western policy-makers like Dr. Henry
Kissinger, the response to that shock had been the liberal internationalist
seeking to equilibrate the shock by taking Keynesian counter-cyclical
measures aimed at avoiding an international economic recession. Thus, to
pay for higher oil prices and the drain of capital from oil-importing
countries, the United States followed a monetarily and fiscally inflationary
policy and encouraged its banks to recycle the petro dollars to oil-importing less-developed countries by making syndicated and uncollateralized
loans available to such countries.9 4 For those countries - many of them
0. Akinla, H, Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Changing Business and
Legal Environment, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 19, 24 (1987).
9 See WORLD BANK, ACcELERATED DEvELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN
AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 29, 29-30 [hereinafter BURG REPORT].
' See, e.g., ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS (1975) (providing an enter-

taining account of the background leading to the oil crisis); DANIEL YERGIN, THE
PRIZE THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 588-744 (1991) (providing a
readable account of the various oil crises).
' As Walter Wriston, former Chairman of Citicorp, explained in a phrase that was
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African - that were still unable to obtain credit on these relaxed commercial terms, special facilities were set up at the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank's International Development Agency to provide
concessional loans financed by the sale of gold as part of the demonetization of that commodity.9'
Between 1974-1981, this liberal internationalist response masked the
fundamental transformation in ideas and policies taking place at the
international level with regard to the concept of development. That
transformation came into plain view with the response of the Western
industrialized countries to the second oil crisis of 1979-1980. This time,
the response was the monetarist and deflationary policy of raising domestic interest rates, thereby reducing the demand for oil.' Not only were
developing countries unable to borrow dollars to meet their increased oil
bills, they found their outstanding debts, which had been made on
floating interest rates, ballooning beyond control.
By August 1982, the nature of the new environment became clear
when Mexico essentially declared a moratorium on the payment of its
liabilities to international banks. The remainder of the 1980s in Africa
and in Latin America was to be dominated by the overriding need to
meet external debt obligations by underperforming economies." For both
continents, it was to be commonly referred to as the lost decade.
This was the climate in which the Lagos Plan and the Burg Report
emerged as competing approaches to the problems of Africa's economic
underperformance. It is not difficult to understand why the romanticism
of self-reliance was bound to lose out to the pragmatism of neostructuralist economics." The Burg Report's emphasis on a set of comsubsequently to haunt him: "countries cannot go bankrupt." BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN
WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS (1986).
95 See, e.g., RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 294 (1985).
96 Cf. STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME 125 (1995) (providing background
relevant to the U.S. response to oil-producing states).
' By the end of the decade, more capital was flowing out of Africa to service external debt obligations entering as development assistance, new loans, or foreign
investments. Despite this negative balance in capital flows, Africa's external indebtedness was increasing rather than declining because the payments were insufficient to
meet the amounts due. This was the case notwithstanding that close to a third of all
foreign earnings went to service the debt.
" The rhetoric of self-reliance was not new in 1980. The former Tanzanian
president, Julius Nyerere, had become an elder statesman of the continent primarily on
the force of the idea of "ujamaa" or local self-reliance. The Lagos Plan was no more
explicit in how the concept was to be implemented than had been prior manifestos.
The Plan was simply an undifferentiated laundry list of areas in which the Member-
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prehensive specific structural changes within individual African states
presaged the group of policies subsequently termed structural adjust-

ment. 99
These fundamental changes, which had implications for politics, po-

litical institutions, and economic welfare, received little attention in the
academic legal community. For practicing lawyers - excepting the
handful who worked for international financial institutions and development agencies - Africa was in the backwaters of international trade and
finance law. This was the case even for lawyers for whom the restructur-

ing of international debt had replaced issues of foreign direct investment
States would cooperate with no specification as to how that cooperation would be fostered or institutionalized. To suggest uniform collaboration on a continent-wide basis in
all of the following demonstrated the lack of realism of the plan: improved agricultural
productivity; food security; African sovereignty over natural resources; industrialization
of the continent; development and management of human resources; technology transfers
and the development of appropriate technologies; improved continent-wide rail, air,
shipping, and trade linkages; financial sector linkages in banking and insurance;
convertibility of local currencies; standardization of the regulatory framework for
multinational corporations; and the creation of a continent-wide economic community.
" Structural adjustment policy generally refers to the set of conditions demanded of
countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a precondition for
approving loans. Typically, these conditions are premised on the belief that national
economic policies should principally rely on functioning market-derived prices excepting urban labor - and less on governmental dictates. Standard procedure involves
teams of experts from international financial institutions being despatched to developing
countries seeking assistance to investigate the conditions on the ground, and then prescribing policies tailored to meet those conditions. See KL1rGAARD, supra note 4, at
229-34 (providing an account of one technical consultant's description of the environment in which these missions often operate). The prescription for growth, progress, and
prosperity invariably followed a pattern: (1) liberalized external trade policies; (2)
currency devaluation; (3) reduction in public sector subsidies to parastatals; (4) privatization of some parastatals; (5) reduction of money supply and growth of credit; (6)
removal of bottlenecks in internal trade such as those imposed on the marketing of
agricultural products by government-sponsored marketing boards and cooperatives; (7)
dismantling of price-controls on basic items such as food and energy; (8) stricter
controls on civil service wages and salaries. See, e.g., FINN TARP, STABniZATION AND
STRUCTURAL ADjUSTMENT: MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING THE CRIsis

IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA 126 (1993); Goran Hyden & Bo Karlstrom, Understanding

Structural Adjustment: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective, in ECONOMIC CRIsIs IN
AFRICA 41, 42-45 (Magnus Blumstrum & Mats Lundahl eds., 1993). While the purpose
of these policies is the reduction of governmental involvement in the national economy,
the effect has been substantial activist state intervention in the civil life of the
population. These policies entailed substantial activist intervention by the government
and the state. See generally WALDEN BELO Er AL, DARK VICTORY (1995) (providing
a systematic critique of structural adjustment).
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and syndicated lending as staples of their practice. Much of Africa's debt
was owed to public entities rather than private lenders.
What accounts for the noticeable international revival of interest in
law and development studies in the 1990s? In explaining the reemergence,
it is difficult to overstate the significance of post-Glastnost developments
in Central and Eastern Europe, and of the post Brady Plan revitalization
of Latin American economies. Both events indicated the reemergence as
dominant actors on the world scene of Western market economies,
especially the United States, and the failure of centrally planned socialist
and corporatist economies."° Moreover, that success propelled public
institutions in Western societies back into the funding arena. It was not
enough that facts on the ground demonstrate the superiority of Western
capitalism, but it was also important that superiority be scientifically
explained to doubters, and that the proper structures for its functioning be
correctly installed in the previously hostile environments of Eastern
Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America.
The ensuing renewed sponsorship of inquiries and the training of
practitioners in the relationship of law and legal institutions to economic
and political activities was bound to have effects on the study of related
issues in the African context. This renewed interest coincided with an
emerging trend in Africa, and the understanding and exploitation of that
trend is crucial if the renewed interest in law and development studies is
to be more than a passing fad.
B. The State and African Development in the 1980s
In looking inward for the direction of Africa's future in the 1980s,
both the Lagos Plan and the Burg Report crystallized a tendency among
African intellectuals and development specialists outside the continent.
Whether driven by romantic or pragmatic considerations, it was evident
that transcending economic poverty and political maturity depended at
least as much on the specific policies of African states as on foreign
governments and the structure of the international system. The consequence of externally imposed structural adjustment policies, foreign donor
fatigue, and the international debt crisis shattered any remaining illusions
of the equivalence of decolonization with independence and demolished
the facade of the African state as the emblem of that independence.
African and foreign scholars systematically began to inquire not so much
into the relationship of African states vis-A-vis other states, but into the
"00See generally FRANCIS

FuKuYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN

(1991) (illustrating events that marked the inevitable and complete triumph of Western
liberal ideology).
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internal structures of the African state and its capacity to fulfill tasks

traditionally associated with the Western liberal state. 101 Unlike the earlier work of many dependency theorists, the new inquiry was not simply
a prelude to broader systemic criticism of the international capitalist
system, but rather it was intended to be programmative.
The new inquiries highlighted the remarkably advanced level of
centralization of power and the control of resources within a very small
number of cities (quite frequently indeed in only one city, the national
capital), and an equally small number of political and economic institutions. 2 The result was that bottlenecks pervaded the administrative

mechanism. The quest for power revolved around the institutions of the
center. The vast majority of persons including the professional and economic elites who could not aspire to gain control over these few centralized institutions, became disengaged from civic life. If political life in

the immediate post-colonial societies was characterized by mass mobili-

zation politics,'" 3 African societies had swung to the other extreme by
the 1980s.
Nor was the state and its institutions good at efficiently organizing

and superintending the economic life of its citizens. Bureaucracies
abounded, but they were to be found predominantly in the capital cities,
far removed from and generally indifferent to the activities they were
supposed to regulate.' Above all, the dominant institution in several

,0, See Young, supra note 50, at 13-42 (delineating the features of the state as
classically formulated and understood in the West), see also James S. Wunsch & Dele
Olowu, The Failure of the CentralizedAfrican State, in FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED
STATE: INSTITUTIONS AND SELF GOVERNANCE IN AnIcA 1, 4-5 (James S. Wunsch &
Dele Olowu eds., 1990).
"o See Wunsch & Olowu, supra note 101, at 4-5.
"3 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLMCAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCMTIES
4 (1968).
04 See Wunsch & Olowu, supra note 101, at 3-5. As they observe,
Even within the central government there is a disproportionate share of manpower and
financial resources (in quantitative and qualitative terms) located at the headquarters
compared with field agencies. The most senior, trained and experienced officials live and
work at the headquarters. The result is that inexperienced and junior officers located in
the more populated countryside have to wait for instructions, even on routine matters,
and focus most of their attention on what they must do to gain a posting at the center.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Similarly poignant is the statement of one of Africa's more
acclaimed leaders, the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere:
There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the
abolition of local government, and the other is the disbanding of the co-operatives. We
were impatient and ignorant ....
The real price we paid was in the acquisition of
top-heavy bureaucracy. We replaced local governments and co-operatives by parastatal
organizations. We thought these organizations run by the state would contribute to prog-
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societies was the military, which rather than facing outward in defense of
territorial borders was noted for its capacity to stage coups d'etat and to
terrorize and render voiceless other claimants to political power.
These centralizing tendencies could not be countered by independent
social organizations because many of these had been emasculated by the
state during the period of mass mobilization. The state, with its disproportionate control and consumption of national assets, had first absorbed
and then rendered powerless such institutions as labor unions, ethnic
benevolent associations, universities, agricultural and marketing co-operatives, and churches."5
The African state was thus in a very exposed position when its
legitimacy was challenged by the coalition of forces that gained ascendance in the West during the 1980s: neo-liberal economists and neoconservative politicians. 6 These forces came together in the structural
adjustment policies of the international financial institutions and the
practical consequences of having to meet untenable debt burdens. Buffeted
by these forces, the African state, at the close of the 1980s, appeared to
be on the verge of disintegration, differing only in the extent, rapidity,
and level of control at which the old order was to be forced out and the
new order was to emerge. Thus in some countries, central authority
collapsed virtually overnight, with the void being filled by. unorganized
groups that recalled the popular mobilization movements of the 1960s.'"
In other countries, the central government belatedly tried to co-opt the
mass population by pleading for a united front against external pressure
and by promising broader economic participation and electoral politics."8
In both instances, the perception at least outside of the continent,
was the resurgence of democratic participatory government; a state of
affairs that fit quite nicely into the emerging global trend. The African
phenomenon was viewed as similar or identical with trends in Europe,

ress because they would be under parliamentary control. We ended up with a huge
machine which we cannot operate efficiently.

Deve Orowu, The Failure of Current Decentralization Programs in Africa, in FAILURE
OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE, supra note 101, at 74, 74-80 (citations omitted).
10s See Wunsch & Olowu, supra note 101,
at 5.
'06 See generally CHRISTOPHER COLCLOUGH, STATES OF
AND THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATE (1993).

IARKETS?: NEO-LIBERALISM

,o7 Events in many Francophone counties, notably Niger, the Congo, and Zaire
followed this patter.
" This was the dominant approach among Anglophone countries such as Nigeria,
Ghana, Zambia, and to a lesser extent, Kenya. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal

indicate, however, that the approach transcended the colonial experience.
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Latin America, and Asia. As in those areas, the prescription for reform
was the marketization of the economy brought about by external technical
assistance acting on newly created and broadly diffused economic and
political pluralistic institutions."° The argument for Western technical
expertise and its relevance to the institutionalization of Western liberal
market ethos was frequently framed in terms of the relevance of law and
a routinized legal order to the success of these transplanted modes of
doing things. In many ways reminiscent of the early law and development
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, these attempts to institutionalize change through law once again focused on external contributions
rather than on the shaping of internal or local forces to support the
changes.
C. Law and Development in the 1990s
Credit for the revival as a discipline of the systematic study of law
and development may be given to the publication of the work of Peruvian
political economists."' Led by Hernando de Soto and operating under
the auspices of the Institute for Liberty (ILD), these political scientists,
economists, and lawyers set out to investigate the "informal economy, a
parallel and in many ways more authentic, hard-working and creative
society than the one that hypocritically calls itself legitimate."'1
The data that they unearthed suggested that state institutions and
actors in case after case, industry after industry, and sector after sector,
operated as negative constraints on an otherwise enterprising population.
The state, their data suggested, rather than acting as the engine of growth,
undermined it."' Moreover, in their most controversial arguments, they
attributed the deadening hand of the state not primarily to the classic institutional shortcomings of administrative incapacities, bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of political will, or absence of managerial and human
resources, but to a narrower and highly specific cultural flaw: the state's
reliance upon certain types of legal mechanisms to assert its supremacy
over private actors."'
" See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREw ARATO, CIVIL SocIET AND POLrmcAL
THEORY 2 (1991).
"a See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUION IN THE

WORLD (June Abbott trans., 1989).
1' Id. at xv.
112 Id. ch. 1-4 (cataloguing and discussing the cost of formality in industry, housing,
trade, and transportation).
"' See Winn, supra note 77. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and PracticalDilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE LJ.2157-60 (1994); George L. Priest,
The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy, 103 YALE LJ. 2259
THRD
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Under this view, informality represented the creative response of
marginalized people to a mercantilist state that employs law to favor
narrow circles of elites. There is nothing inherently bad with the state's
use of law, only with specific legal processes. Thus, "good law" guarantees and promotes economic efficiency, while "bad law" "impedes or disrupts it..'" 4 Defining law in the positivistic sense of the existence of
formal rules, regulations, statutes, and procedures, de Soto maintained that
law imposes two sorts of constraints on economic actors: the cost of
access or entry, and the cost of remaining formal." 5 The definition of
interests, their protection, promotion of general well-being, and the raising
of revenues are legitimate concerns of law. However, the costs associated
with effectuating these objectives can be overbearing. It is in the state's
capacity to calibrate properly and minimize such costs that difficulties
arise. If the costs are too high, persons otherwise disposed to conform to
the law (and de Soto contends that most economic actors ordinarily seek
to obey the law)' are transformed into informals, who skirt legal constraints by carrying on economic activities outside of formally regulated
sectors. The consequence is a net loss to society because the informals
lose the protection of legitimation through law, and society suffers the
erosion of protected activities, confidence in legal protections, and revenue
loss from the taxing of economic activities withdrawn from the formal
sectors. Informality, de Soto and his colleagues argue, must be understood
as an indigenous response to the unproductive use of law." 7
While these are interesting insights, they might have gone unnoticed,
- at least outside of Peru and perhaps Latin America - but for two
additional conclusions said to flow from these research findings. First, the
crisis of Peru's economic underperformance, claimed de Soto, and other
publicists such as the novelist Varga Llosa and U.S. based law and economic scholars, was attributable as such to the waste of human resources
generated by bad law as to external factors."' In this sense, the empirical evidence furnished by de Soto directly challenged the hypothesis and
conclusions of dependency and underdevelopment theorists who attributed
underdevelopment to the peripheral placing of the peoples and countries

(1994); Arthur J. Jacobson, The Other Path of the Law, 103 YALE LJ. 2213 (1994);
Saskia Sassen, Between New Developments and Old Regulations, 103 YALE LJ. 2289

(1994).
114

"I
116

DE SOTO, supra note 110, at 132.
Id. at 133-46.
See id. at 153 (stating that in its interviews, ILD found that avoiding punishment

was the main concern of informals).
'" See id. ch. 5.
" Id. at xxiii.
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of the Southern hemisphere within a hierarchically structured capitalist
system."9 Second, the determination of a nation's economic performance
was within its regulatory control. To assure optimal economic performance, the state had to reduce the regulation of economic activities and
allow the market to flourish.
This analysis coincided with the increasingly dominant neo-liberal
teachings of economic development experts in the 1980s, and with the
law and economic school that gained significant sway in American legal
institutions.'" Proponents of these schools of thought were found to be
not only in academic settings, but in the 1980s, they were dominant
actors and advisers in policy-making positions within the Thatcher and
Reagan governments and the government-sponsored international financial
institutions."' Indeed, taken at face value, these conclusions were equally acceptable to the increasingly influential nongovernmental organizations
in the West which, while not fully endorsing the marketization creed,
nonetheless sought to have official Western assistance redirected from
government-to-government funding to the funding of private initiatives
and programs to be directed and channelled, whenever possible, by
NGOs." Put another way, the findings of de Soto and the ILD were in
perfect sync with the determinative spirit of the 1980s.
But if the conclusions of de Soto were embraced by policy-makers,
its methodology did not much survive the publication of de Soto's book.
While it generated renewed interest in the relationship of law and development, that interest was directed at the viability in emerging market
societies of these ideas, relationships, and institutions as transplanted from
Western industrial democracies, not at unearthing their roots and nurturing
those roots within the local communities." Thus transformed, de Soto's
work, like Glastnost and the Brady Plan, confirmed the efficacy for
development purposes of Western international capitalism, the superiority
of the market approach, and the relevance to both of Western-style
electoral politics.'"

119See Jacobson, supra note 113, at 2213.
," Cf.DE SOTO, supra note 110, at xxvi (listing inter alia North American scholars

involved in the law and economics field).
2, See, e.g., Colclough, supra note 106, at 6.
1,2See, e.g., DAvID C. KoRTEN, GETrING TO TIIE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: VOLUNTARY ACTION AND THE GLOBAL AGENDA (1992).

" One possible exception to this approach may be the idea of civil society. But
even here, the value of the idea seems to reside in the extent to which its roots and
presumptive future success can be anchored in Western classical thinkers like Hegel,
Weber, and Arendt.
"2 President Clinton of the United States gave the official rationale in a 1993
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As Western governments and private institutions again began financing inquiries into law and development, they explicitly stated that the goal
of their financing was to underwrite tracts that established and perpetuated
these axiomatic relationships."as Institutions such as AID and the World
Bank funded research programs to demonstrate the efficacy of the market,
the need for the privatization of economies, and the relationship between
these economic actions and the promotion of human rights, democratic

address to the General Assembly of the United Nations:
The United States believes that an expanded community of market democracies not only
serves our own security interests, it also advances the goals enshrined in this body's
charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For broadly based prosperity is
clearly the strongest form of preventive diplomacy. And the habits of democracy are the
habits of peace ....
Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest. It rewards tolerance, not hatred.
Democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make more reliable partners in
trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment. In democracies
with the rule of law and respect for political, religious, and cultural minorities are more
responsive to their own people and to the protection of human rights.
Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
U.S. News Wire, Sept. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
[hereinafter Address by the President].
" See, e.g., The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open
Market Support Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, § 101, 106 Stat. 3320, 3322
(1992); The Support For East European Democracy Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179,
103 Stat. 1298 (codified as 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5401-5495 (1989)); and annual appropriation bills, which expressly provide funding for activities in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the purpose of "promot[ing] political
democracy and economic pluralism . . . by abetting the development in those nations
of private business sectors, labor market reforms, and democratic institutions." Id.

1997]

LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

209

institutions, and political freedom in emerging societies." Some of
these programs were directly geared to Africa."z
Is this new approach any more likely to succeed? While it is too
early to offer a definitive answer, contemporary evidence calls into
question an unequivocal affirmative response. Although recent developments in Mexico and its reverberations in other Latin American and
Southeast Asian countries"2 manifest the tender but pliant reed on
"

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note

86, at 60 ("Underlying the litany of Africa's

development problems is a crisis of governance.").
In 1989, the World Bank funded an experimental program in Argentina that
emphasized the development of Western-style legal institutions and which has been the
foundation for other programs in Latin America and the Caribbean region. See, e.g.,
Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements of
Reform (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996). The World Bank has a unit in
its Legal Department dedicated to legal reform and private sector development whose
function is the provision of technical services to borrower countries on the structuring
of institutions for the promotion of private sector involvement.
Programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of
State, and quasi-public institutions like the National Institute for Democratic Reform that
are intended to further transplant U.S. institutions to recipients of U.S. foreign assistance abound. These programs range from activities in Africa to Latin America, Central
Europe, and Eastern Europe. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN

AssIsTANCE:

PROMOTING JuDiciAL REFORM TO STRENGTHEN DEmOCRACms

1 (1993).

" See, e.g,. Public and Private Nonprofit Organizations in Support of International
Educational and Cultural Activities: Exchange Programs to Promote the Strengthening
of the Rule of Law in Africa Through Judicial and Public Defender Training, 59 Fed.
Reg. 22,888, 22,888 (1994); Public and Private Nonprofit Organizations in Support of
International Educational and Cultural Activities: Exchange Programs to Promote the
Strengthening of the Rule of Law in Africa Through the Development of Law Schools
and Bar Associations, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,043, 19,043 (1994); International Educational and
Cultural Activities Discretionary Grant Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,569, 32,571 (1995)
(requesting proposals for projects addressing the rule of law to include three or four
countries in one subregion of Africa); International Educational and Cultural Activities
Discretionary Grant Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,733, 64,734 (1994) (stating that "[wihile
proposals in all fields [for Africa] are encouraged, emphasis will be given to proposals
which focus on strengthening democratic institutions.").
" Consider, as an example, the unforeseen nature and aftermath of the collapse of
the Mexican Peso in December 1994. The resulting demonstration of the fickleness of
the international investment community's confidence in the Mexican economy and those
of "emerging" countries does not augur well for the creation of a fully integrated
international economy that is geographically or culturally undifferentiated by factors of
production, access to capital, security of savings, or similar economic yardsticks. The
size and suddenness of the outflow of portfolio investments from Mexico and the other
emerging economies, and the radical and externally dictated measures adopted to
staunch the outflows highlight the persistence of the dichotomy between the relatively
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which the new order rests, that uncertainty is much longer in the
making in the African context. 3

independent core capitalist economies and the "disarticulated" peripheral economies that
was the central contribution of the Dependency theorists. The cause of, responsibility
for, and extent to which the Mexican crisis is emblematic of the emerging new
economic order has generated much debate which extends well beyond the scope of
this Article, but the answers to which are bound to reverberate in the study of the
relationship between the international economic system and development policies in the
emerging and less developed economies of the South. See, e.g., Rory Macmillan, The
Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 305-10 (1995); Clay Chandler,
IMF Ties Peso Crisis to Mexican Investors: Report Now Disputes Foreign Role in
Collapse, WASH. POST, Aug. 21 1995, at Al. On the significance of the peso crisis for
Mexico and for bilateral relations between Mexico and the United States, see JORGE G.
CASTA&EDA, THE MEXICAN SHOCK (1995); Anne Swardson & Martha M. Hamilton,
Investment Funds Link Economies, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1995, at A2. Nonetheless, the
resolution of these debates is significantly relevant to any prognosis for the future
direction and integration of the peripheral economies and societies of much of the
Third World, including Africa, into the assertedly new order.
'29 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST AsIAN MmACLE vi (1993) [hereinafter EAST ASIAN
MIRACLE]. As the Bank's president acknowledged, the Southeast Asian economies "used
very different combinations of policies, from hands-off to highly interventionist." Id; see
also Albert E. Fishlow & Katherine Gwin, Overview: Lessons from the East Asian
Experience, in ALBERT E. FISHLOw Er AL., MIRACLE OR DESIGN: LESSONS FROM THE

EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (1994) (stating that the Bank's report "represents an
important acknowledgment by the World Bank that industrial policy, involving systematic government intervention in the market over extended periods of time, played a role
in the rapid economic growth of the East Asian region."). Nor is belief in a hands-off
approach by governments shared by all successful economies. Japanese officials appear
to be particularly critical of the newly found zeal of the international financial
institutions to condition assistance to developing countries on their adoption of Western
institutions, economic practices, and political ideology. See Nira Wickramasinghe, From
Human Rights to Good Governance: The Aid Regime in the 1990s, in THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 305, 318-19 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 1996)

The Japanese had begun complaining about the Bank's aid policies in the early 1990s.
They pointed out that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan had developed according to a far
different model. The governments of the East Asian "dragons" worked closely with
business to develop strategies for growth. Nationalized banks gave low-interest loans and
grants to selected industries. Governments restricted foreign investment to maintain
control over the direction of economic development. Subsidies were granted to businesses in exchange for specific performance requirements. Planners placed a high priority on
becoming competitive through higher productivity rather than through lower wages.
Id.

," The contention is not that African crises are identical to the difficulties being
experienced by Mexico. Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa) has not
had the fortune of attracting significant foreign portfolio investments, so that loss of
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African countries, like Eastern Europe and Latin America, in the late

1980s and early 1990s appeared to be undergoing fundamental economic
and political structural change.'

Virtually every country on the conti-

nent embarked on significant restructuring of the economy, especially with
regard to the content of governmental involvement in micro-economic
activities. In many cases the countries adopted some form of privatization
or commercialization,'

practices intended to marketize the economy,

reduce public subsidies, and devolve decision-making into private hands,
with the expectation that such decisions would be governed by standard
micro-economic rules of efficiency and the disciplining constraints of the

profit-motive. Similarly, political liberalization - in the sense of opening
up the political process to permit broader popular participation through

the ballot box -

gained a cachet not embraced since the mid-1960s'

While there were some doubters," the dominant perspective at the
'turn of the decade was that these policies were generating positive
changes in Africa. 5 Indeed, one of those who had catalogued and
decried Africa's stagnation
in the mid-1980s was, in 1991, writing of
136
Africa's recovery.

But this resurgence did not last. The obvious manifestations of
change like the transfer of power from long-term dictatorships to popular-

confidence in its economy by foreign investors is not likely to create the widespread
dislocations of daily existence evident in Mexico. Nonetheless, African economies, like
Mexican and other emerging economies continue to demonstrate a high level of dependence on decisions made externally and an incapacity to shield the effects of those decisions through countervailing domestic policies. Policy makers in these societies tend
to act as if restoring external confidence ought to be the dominant concern, even where
the effect may be arguably antithetical to domestic interests.
,'3 See, e.g, Julius E. Nyang'oro, The Evolving Rule of the African State Under
Structural Adjustment, in BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 86, at 12, 23;
Jennifer A. Widner, Introduction to ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLrIiAL LiBERAluzAnTON
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Jennifer Widner ed., 1994).
232 See, e.g., PRIVATiZATION AND INVESTmENT IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Rexford A.
Ahene & Bernard S. Katz eds., 1991); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law and the Political
Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE (1996);
Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Privatization and Commercialization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 87
ANN. PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 111 (1993).
"' See generally Widner, supra note 131, at 2-4 (discussing the political liberalization in Africa between 1989-1992).
" See, e.g., Julius E. Nyang'oro & Timothy M. Shaw, African Development and the
New InternationalDivision of Labor, in BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note
86, at 1, 6.
See. e.g.. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. supra note 86.
'
See Widner, supra note 131.
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ly elected ministers became bogged down in intricate manoeuvering that
suggested the ancient regime would not compliantly wither away in the
manner being forecast. 1 7 Even in those few instances where govern-

ments had changed hands as part of the emerging new order, policies
soon relapsed into the old mode of rule by edicts and lack of accountability. 8 Moreover, change of governments through military coups
d'etat reappeared as the norm rather than as the exception.'39
But these political reversals were notable only for being more visible
than the economic retrenchments equally underway. Privatization, the most
symbolic of the alleged economic transformations in the continent, turned
out to be more theoretical than real, and by mid-1994 had virtually
halted." Not even the World Bank could disguise the unsatisfactory
results of structural adjustment policies or privatization. 4'
" This was the case notably in Zaire and Kenya. For one statement of this shifting
political environment from optimism to pessimism, see Jean-Germain Gros, The Hard
Lessons of Cameroon 1993, J. OF DEMOCRACY, July 1, 1995, at 112.
" Events in Zambia are the most glaring illustration of this tendency which is also
noticeable in other countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Niger, and
Zimbabwe. In Zambia, the Chiluba government which came to power through a popular
election that ended a quarter of a century of dominance by Kenneth Kaunda's United
National Independence Party now seeks to foreclose meaningful multiparty political processes through the dubious stratagem of amending Zambia's constitution to provide that
only those persons born in Zambia, and all of whose parents and grandparents were
born in Zambia, are eligible to hold the office of the President, an amendment which
unashamedly is intended to rule out return to political power by Dr. Kaunda.
,' Notable among military coups d'etat in Africa since 1989 are those in Nigeria,
Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Borkina Fasso. There have also been short-lived coups in
the island states of Sao Tome, Principe, and the Comoros.
" The privatization process in Nigeria is illustrative. The program was the direct
product of a palace coup by military officers led by General Ibrahim Babangida that
ousted a previous military government in August 1985. Encouraged and supported by
the Washington-based international financial institutions and a structural adjustment
policy, the contours of the privatization and commercialization program were formally
delineated in a highly legalistic military decree of July 1986. Implementation, however,
did not begin until 1989. In 1993, following the nullification of the results of a
national presidential election, the implementation process came to a halt. Following
another seizure of power by the military in late 1993, the entire process was for all
practical purposes terminated. In his 1994 budget speech, the new head-of-state, General
Sanni Abacha, announced that government assets would be leased to private managers.
Meanwhile, the country's four largest commercial banks which had been privatized
amidst claims of profiteering by the purchasers are apparently under consideration for
re-nationalization. See The Political Scene: The Government is to Relaunch
Privatisation, ECONOMIST'S INTELLIGENCE UNrr, Feb. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, EIU File.
,41 See Aid for Africa: Nothing to Loose But Your Chains, ECONOMIlST, Mar. 5,

19971

LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

213

The widespread protests that followed the sudden devaluation of the
CFA franc in 1994 were reminiscent of the bad old days.14 Similarly,
Nigeria, the bellwether of the new African age, faltered. Not only was the
country besieged by political instability, a palace military coup, and the
termination of its flaunted privatization program, but in 1994, it jettisoned
ten years of liberalization of its foreign trade and payments regime by
returning to a fixed exchange rate and imposing restrictions on foreign
exchange remittances. 43
One searches in vain for adequate elucidation of these new trends in
the revitalized law and development scholarship. The new teaching, like
the old, is justified and legitimated in tenors of the capacity to mold and
adapt the internal policies of these emergent or transitional societies so
that they conform to the prescriptions of the external factors. Conclusions
as to the success or failure of law in the development processes of these
societies are packaged and presented in tenors of the interests associated
with the United States and the West. These are sometimes articulated in
the phraseology of "national," or "security interest," but they are more
frequently stated in the culturally abstruse language of "market capitalism," "rule of law," or "democracy." Whatever the framing, the interests
of the developing country are taken into account only in that they are
represented as symbiotic to the primary interests of the funding body.
One can of course conceive of other ways to explore the interaction
between law and development. The relationship might be viewed from the
perspective of seeking to understand or attempting to establish the complex web of relationships existing between legal, economic, social, and
political concerns. It might be postulated that a proper understanding of
those relationships requires the scholar to forego an instrumentalist conception of her task. To do so, the inquiry must first look to the in-depth
articulation of the societal context within which the institutions and
persons that shape these concerns operate, and second, demand a focused
and limited conception of development. In short, while aspirations for the
routinization of the relationship of law and development may be universal, their realization is ultimately local and should be accepted as such.
Similarly, while it is possible and indeed worthwhile to make general
statements about the role of law in development, the actual operation of

1994, at 21;

WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSmSS: THE ECONOMICS AND PoLrncs

OF GOvERNMENT OwNERsI-I
142

(1995).
See, e.g., A Flicker of Light, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1994, at 21.

'43 See Abiodum Alao, Nigeria: The Return of the Military, JANE's INTELLIGENCE
REV., Mar. 1994, at 141, 143. The country has since announced a shift to marketdetermined exchange rate policies. See Budget Speech of General Sanni Abacha, BBC,
Jan. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBC File.
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those statements will vary significantly from one society to another, and
should not be examined to produce some universal outcome.
IV. A REAPPRAISAL OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
The discussion of the issue of what, if anything, law has to say to
economic, socio-cultural, and political development understandably has
been the preserve of persons trained in law. Among such trained persons,
the instrumentalist view of the relationship of law and development is
represented by the debate over causation. Would some positivistic piece
of legislation encourage or deter particular behavior? What is the optimal
tinkering with of the form or content of legislation that would produce
the preferred behavior? Can the relevant processes be institutionalized?
The legal scholar tends to frame these questions in somewhat
abstract or hypothetical terms, while the practicing lawyer presents them
in the context of specific problems. In either case, the operative
assumption is that the worth of the investigation lies in the instrumental
value of the answer that is obtained. The approach thus curtails the
exposition of the normative preferences embedded in the particular
conception of law or development.'" Lacking that foundation, the disillusionment with the various prescriptive results is hardly difficult to
understand.
The remainder of this Article sketches out ways in which attention
to the normative implications of the understanding of law have direct
significance for the interpretation of the link between law and development, and the influence of that understanding for prescriptive
recommendations. An intended collateral consequence is to explain why
our normative conception of development needs to undergo some
retinkinering in the West.
A. Law's Reach
In the early days of law and development, there was a genuine
debate among legal scholars, anthropologists, and sociologists as to what
constituted law. 45 Those interested in the definition of law for instru-

" The liberal legalist scholars came closest to an analytical critique of the relationship of law and development. Yet the three most penetrating of those analyses were
invariably descriptive and prescriptive. None questioned the propriety of the underlying
normative ideal of transforming developing societies into prototypes of Western
capitalism. Cf. Trubek, Social Theory, supra note 2; Trubek & Galanter, supra note 8,
at 1073-78; Burg, supra note 11.
" See generally Kuper & Kuper, supra note 37 (presenting the various views and
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mentalist purposes took a formalistic view that limited law to positivistic
directives of the state.
Acephalous traditional societies clearly had no law since they did not
constitute states, and they did not seek to compel acceptance of specified
modes of behavior through the exercise of state authority. It followed that
law was itself a part of development, because development required the
transformation of traditional into modem societies, the definitive and
central attribute of which was the bureaucratized nation-state. The more
institutionalized the rule of law, the more developed the society.
Others found such a formalistic view of law too bounded. They
contended that any definition of law had to be provided within the
specified context of the purpose for which the definition was sought. For
example, the search for a definition of law is hedged by at least three
determinants. First, there is the concern over function. What is the
purpose of law, and how is that purpose realized by the proposed or
generally accepted definition of law? Second, there is the structural
conception of law by which the definition of law is extracted from the
interactions of persons and institutions in a society - interactions and
relationships that occur and are fueled by both conscious and unconscious
behavioral patterns. Third, law is "ideational," in the sense that it embodies both the spirit of the times of a society, as well as the aspirations for
which a people strive. Law here is the culmination of past experiences,
contemporary beliefs, exigent measures, and future objectives. The meaning of law thus cannot be captured solely by the legislative and regulatory acts of the state or its institutions; rather its meaning derives from the
entire society, its history, past and present, its norms as well as its
practices.
Whatever those initial debates, it was the positivistic conception of
law and development that triumphed under the dominant aegis of the
liberal legalist school. It is also that conception of law that dominates in
the revived law and development philosophy. Indeed, given the now
seemingly unquestioned triumph of the market-centered industrial capitalist
mode of production, accumulation, and distribution, it is generally argued
that only societies that implement the legal framework underwriting this
regime will experience the thrill of success as being "developed."
Several difficulties attend this argument. In the first place, distilling
magic elements of law essential to capitalism is by no means easy, and
the relevant considerations that should be taken into account when doing
so certainly are not uncontroversial.'" Thus, it is commonplace to in-

analyses of what constitutes law in an African context).
" See, e.g., David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972
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yoke the necessity of a legal regime that respects and protects private
property. But as the most rudimentary of comparative exercises demonstrates, what constitutes private property - and the means by which respect and protection are afforded such property - vary substantially even
among related societies.
Second, demonstrating the link between the legal elements and the
economic or political success of a society is hardly a straightforward
undertaking: the idea that one can correlate legal measures that successfully further such respect and protection in economic development is a
chimera. That many assume that relationship today is at best hubris, but
more fundamentally, it is destructive of the discipline of humanistic
learning.
Third, to the extent some successful legal elements can be distilled,
transplanting those elements to other societies poses significant problems;
although that alone does not argue against the effort.
Fourth, and perhaps most significant, on closer inspection, the
assumed uniformity of factors and relationships between law and development disintegrates. Relationships exist, but they are multifaceted,
dynamic, and perhaps not reproducible. This is not to argue against
attempts to understand and retrieve them. The effort is worth undertaking
not only for the functional utility of any results that are achieved, but
also because it enriches our understanding of law. It is to suggest, however, the possibility of exploring law in development in non-instrumentalist terms.
1. Law in "Law and Development"
One of the more remarkable features of the current debate over the
role of law in development is the persistence of a positivistic description
of law. Ignoring many of the most useful insights about law in the last
three decades, 47 positivist adherents continue to present law in terms of
governments prescribing appropriate rules to regulate title and transference

Wis. L. REv. 720, 751 [hereinafter Trubek, Max Weber on Law].
" The legal realist and critical legal studies movements and its offshoots have
effectively demonstrated that law is manifested and deployed through a variety of
means, of which the positivistic elements reflect only a part. The role of state fiat in
fashioning behavior and response cannot be ignored, but of no less significance are numerous intersecting formal and informal networks of processes and institutions that both
shape and reflect socio-political relationships, economic interactions, and religious
engagements. These networks of relationships meet the demands imposed on them
through equally varied methodologies, ranging from formal adjudication to stylized
story-telling. See Chibundu, supra note 2, at 1479-83.

19971

LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

217

of interests in property; the provision of functioning institutional processes
and mechanisms by which disputes may be resolved; the existence of an
efficient bureaucracy to entertain and process requests; and the provision
of the assurance of transparency in the conduct of all of these functions. For each one of these elements of law, one can usually point
to a model illustration from a Western developed society. Indeed, they are
all borrowed from the study of the modernization phenomenon in the
West.'49 These contentions are usually justified on the ground that the
rule of law operates to provide certainty of knowledge, security of
interests, predictability, and confidence for the system's future participants.
Putting aside the validity of these claims for even Western societies,
and for the moment deferring discussion of the relationship these factors
have for economic and political development, there remains as a central
concern their import for a modem conception of the relationship of law
to society.
For African society today, there is and can be no certitude as to the
parameters of what constitutes law. Neither the formalist nor the realist
conception of law, grounded in the historically derived particulars of
Western institutions and practices provide adequate elucidation of the path
to the development of law for these societies. Thirty years of the postcolonial experience amply demonstrate these societies are not simply
genetic offsprings of colonial metropolitan states. They are, in the sense
that matters, separate entities the contours of whose constitution are in

" See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1995); Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the
Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L W. 1 (1994) (applying a law and
economics model to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe).

Professor Richard Epstein has provided an elegant justification for the universal
applicability of Western legal methodologies for dealing with transitional societies.
Contending that all societies are confronted with two basic realities: scarcity of material
goods and basic self-interest, he formulates the problem of governance in terms of the
capacity of a society to define effective means of accounting for the former, while
coping with the latter. Western legal regimes whether civil or common law based, share
essential attributes in their conception of tort, property, and contract rights which have
successfully mediated and held within tolerable bounds the competition for scarce
resources by self-interested beings. Similarly, what transpires in other societies will
depend on their capacity to learn from and harness these first principles of scarcity and
self-interested behavior. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U.
CHm. L. REV. 555, 559-69 (1991). Cf. Chibundu, supra note 2, at 1491-92 (discussing
the significance for structural theory of changes in the conception of the "self' between
the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries).
, See generally Galanter, supra note 32, 156-57.
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flux. Equating the post-colonial African state with its Western European
or North American namesake may continue to serve satisfactorily its
fictional role in interstate relations - although even this claim is questionable"s - but the fiction is no longer tenable when dissected from
within the African state itself.'
The concept of the state is, at best, a complicated idea. Nonetheless,
it has typically implied a territorially determined community bound with
some assurance of protection to the members which is often reciprocated
by a sense of belonging on the part of the protected. Law frequently
mediates the protection. It may do so by prescribing and enforcing
hierarchies, or by imparting a sense of procedural rectitude or legitimation
to otherwise objectionable acts. The state is thus as much a creature of
the law as law is of the state. Both are shaped by on-going conflicts and
compromises among groups and forces within the geographical space over
whose character the question of the state's nature is fought. Thus, the
stability of the state depends on the predictability of law, and the predictability of the character of the state is intertwined with the stability of
what counts as law. Ultimately, the contours of both are shaped and
dictated by the sources of the conflicts and compromises, including
human and economic resources, social and political institutions, and
external pressures and alliances. External influences, however, should not
be given more than their due, which for the most part are no more than
tertiary or quaternary.
For the African state, in very practical terms, a discussion of what
constitutes law - how it is generated, and how it directly relates to
development - implicates primary questions of its being: its corporate
identity and purpose, the scope of its powers, its internal structure and
organization, and its responsiveness to the demands for protection from
component groups and interests. Thinking about law in development, then,
should not and cannot be primarily about the effectiveness or supremacy
of law over extralegal or informal practices, for such a focus assumes the
basic question to be answered. Namely, what constitutes law in a recently
artificially constituted society being buffeted by forces that are themselves
in transition, and therefore, necessarily amorphous? Similarly, the issue of
law and development cannot be simply about the juxtaposition of formal
'

See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 75.

I

See generally ApTER, supra note 23; Young, supra note 50, at 3-4 (reflecting the

general pessimism among African leaders regarding the growth of the newly independent state by the end of the 1970s); THE PRECARIOuS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCMTY
IN AFRICA (Donald Rothschild & Naomi Chazen eds., 1988) [hereinafter PRECARIous
BALANCE] (discussing the interactions between state and society in terms of the erosion
of the legitimacy of state institutions after African independence).
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and institutional structures characteristic of modem societies by or against
traditional structures.
The consequence of this orientation for the study of law in development is illustrated below. For the moment, the basic point to be underscored is that law can make substantial contributions to development, not
simply by articulating and promoting well-worn conventional ideas that
may have influenced economic and political growth in Western industrial
societies, but by exploring and articulating unique definitions of law and
the state that emerge from the relationships of internal structures, persons,
and politics in societies that are in search of themselves. The critical issue
in this framework is not whether military decrees, one party legislative
enactments, or "kangaroo judgments" (as contrasted with bills passed by
bicameral legislatures of freely and openly elected representatives, or the
pronouncements of life-tenured judges) constitute law, but an understanding of why one rather than the other exists, and what that understanding
tells about the process of state creation law-making. Law, then, speaks directly to the interactions of people within a society, how they shape that
society to meet their aspirations: how their failures frustrate those aspirations, and how they respond to their frustrations and aspirations. In large
measure, it is the need to acquire such understanding that has been
missing in how lawyers and legal scholars have theorized and practiced
law in the context of its relevance for development.
2. The Relationship of Law to Development
The instrumentalist approach to the study of law and development is
underpinned by the assumption of a unilinear relationship between law
and development in general, and law and economic performance in
particular."' The belief is that law functions to attract foreign investments, and to improve the efficient and productive utilization of resources. In this sense, law is an exogenous factor whose contribution to
development can be maximized through independent action by the state.
This conventional statement of the relationship is presented at two
levels. At the macro level, law is said to create, protect, and perpetuate

generally Gray & Jarosz, supra note 148. Although the old liberal legalist
view of law and development focused on economic development, the collapse of the
Communist political systems of Eastern Europe in tandem with their economic systems
led to sweeping generalizations where the asserted supremacy of capitalist production
is equated with liberal democratic government. See, e.g., Address by the President,
supra note 124; Thomas M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REv.
1, 28 (1994); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 90 (1992).
1S2 See
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the basic ingredients of development: the right to own and transfer
property and the right to vote. The assumption is that these rights, being
creatures of law, are fostered or destroyed by law. The goal is to nurture
a legal regime that promotes these rights.
Prior to the recent unalloyed enthusiasm for the market, some
suggested that there may be some trade-off at the macro level between
the various forms of development. For example, it was argued that there
might be an inverse correlation between economic growth and political
liberalization, and perhaps between distributive equity and economic
performance. To the extent that legal directives had impacts on political
liberalization and distributive justice, law affected development. Moreover,
the consistency and competence with which the relevant laws were
generated and applied were consequential factors since they said such
about the predictability and stability of the governing regime.
At the micro level, specific legal instruments operate to regulate
conduct by authorizing and enforcing the use of particular incentives and
penalties. In the economic arena, foreign direct investment might be
encouraged or hindered by specific provisions of tax and foreign exchange regulations, import and export licenses, immigration and residency
requirements, and laws on foreign and indigenous ownership in sectors of
the economy. While it is accepted that the propriety of legal rules should
depend to a considerable extent on the local environment, the trend more
recently has been to suggest that the applicable rules should be standardized. The belief appears to be that in a competitive global marketplace,
such standardization of rules renders more efficient decision making on
cross-border investing, and decision makers are thus more likely to make
their investments in those societies whose rules approximate those to
which they already have been exposed.
Nor is the clamor for universalist rules limited to the economic
arena. Although nascent, assertions increasingly are being made that
political development entails not simply broad political participation such
as that theoretically at the core of liberal plural democracies, but in
specific forms of political engagements and guarantees such as freedom
of the press, gender equality, bicameral legislatures, and judicial review.
The purported relationship of law to development is, however, no
more than surmise. Stripped to its essence, it is a culturally determined
argument for policies likely to encourage participation by investors from
Western Europe and North America in the economies of Southern countries. However, the countries commonly pointed to as illustrations of the
possibility of economic development for the periphery - the so-called
newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia - hardly provide support
for the significance of law for economic or political development. Rather,
to the extent that the economic performance of those countries were
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influenced by external forces and investments (and it is difficult to argue
otherwise), explicitly political rather than subtle legal factors shape these
involvements. The ideologically framed and politically motivated antiCommunist campaigns against the People's Republic of China, Vietnam,
North Korea, and the Soviet Union were a good deal more responsible
for Western participation and the successes of the "Southeast Asian
Tigers" than was their use of legal instruments to shape the form of their
development. This is not to deny the importance of local personnel,
policies, and culture; but to iterate that the emphasis on the packaging of
legal attributes was not decisive. These countries may have succeeded
despite the absence of such legal underpinnings. Thus, the conventional
assertion of the role of law in protecting private property tended to be
conspicuously absent with regard to the disposition of interests in intellectual property. Yet, it was specifically in industries that rely heavily on
such interests like the assembly of electronic components based on
technological blueprints and software, that these countries excelled.
More recently, the "newly emerging economies" found predominantly
in Latin America and South Asia are being touted as success stories. Yet,
the evidence that law, as conventionally defined, has played a significant
role in the resuscitation of these economies is at best speculative. The
reduction of barriers to foreign ownership of property within these
countries, the liberalization of policies on foreign exchange transactions,
and the reduction of state ownership of productive assets, have certainly
been implemented under recognizable legal regimes. Yet, to the extent
that these influences evoked responses from the West, those responses do
not appear to be motivated by a perception of increased security from the
legal changes. Rather, the nature of the response has been to seek such
protection in market structures. For example, the flow of portfolio investments has dwarfed foreign direct investments, and it is the latter type of
investments much more than the former that would respond most coherently to legal rules.
The case then for the existence of a direct relationship between law
and development is by no means clear. At a minimum, we need to reassess our conception of law to understand its relevance and relationship to
economic and political development.
3. The Transplantation of Law
The difficulties inherent in reasoning from the experiences of one
society to a prescription for another have long provided some salient critiques of the early modernization and law and development scholarship.
The task demands comprehensive understanding of the societies, the
capacity to identify and isolate relevant causal factors in the experiences
of one and in the future development of the other, and a certain level of
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distance from both societies so that the scholar is at once sympathetic and
dispassionate. Perhaps most daunting, the scholar who undertakes the task
must apply descriptive knowledge gained from the study of one society
to endorse the prescriptive aspirations of the other. Whether this task can
ever be undertaken successfully in any field of learning is open to
question. The likelihood of its success with regard to law is virtually
nonexistent.
The usual mode of analysis is to conceptualize those elements of a
legal system deemed influential in the development experience of one
society, and hypothesize the fit of those elements within a developing
society. That the relevant elements can be classified in numerous ways
and abstracted in various forms is readily conceded. Nor is the legal
scholar particularly dogmatic about the consistency of the fit. Thus,
elements of the legal concept can be modified in the process of transplantation to accommodate both the change in environment and time.
No sophisticated lawyer or academic today subscribes to the vulgar
view of law as a commodity easily transplanted from one society to
another. Yet, the view that legal institutions can, with some modest
tinkering, be beneficially and effectively exported from advanced industrial societies to developing countries, continues to exert substantial influence in practice. Whatever lip-service is paid to the peculiar conditions of
particular societies, the instrumentalist conception of law invariably exerts
its dominance in the routine assumption that material prosperity is tantamount to social stability, which is a product of law. Rarely pausing to
explore the causal link among these indicators, practitioners and academics in developing and developed societies alike treat them as bundled
agents, differing only as to what minor adjustments ought to be made at
the margins.
Now that the globe seems to be marching to one drum beat, that of
the free enterprise capitalist system, it follows that the legal institutions
and practices that have fostered and sustained the triumph of the capitalist
mode of production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption are best
suited for other societies, appropriately modified at the margins to account
for the peculiar foibles of those societies. Not surprisingly, then, the
apostles, priests, and lay missionaries of law, as typically understood and
practiced in the industrialized countries, have fanned out to all corners of
the globe, preaching the gospel of clear individual title to property rights,
a functioning judicial system to adjudicate such rights, transparency of
administrative and tax edicts, consistent enforcement of such edicts, the
separation of powers, judicial review of administrative and legislative
decisions, private ordering and adjudication of rights through arbitration
whenever possible, and a minimalist approach to regulation by the state.
Although often clothed in the garb of international law, the scripture is
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simply one of a particularized global standard to be implemented within
national territories."'

But even when one narrows and restates the transplantation project
in this technocratic form, significant problems continue to attend the
project. Most clear is the axiomatic fact that prescriptive projects invariably carry normative underpinnings, and technocratic language, however successful in obscuring those implications, does not remove them.
Inherent in the process of isolating and transplanting those features of a
legal regime deemed critical to the success of a market-based economy
are the making of choices as to the appropriate trade-offs between equity
and efficiency, distribution and accumulation, consumption and savings,
popular participation and technocratic elitism, and similar variables. Those
choices may have been made by industrialized societies, but it does not
follow that industrializing countries ought to assume them.
Second, even assuming that we can determine the optimal normative
preferences of people who have not manifested their choices through their
own internal processes, we simply do not know enough about the causal
relationship of law to social and economic forces to permit any meaningful effort at calibrating the interaction of these forces to yield the soughtafter normative objective.
It is sometimes argued that the response to these difficulties is not
the abandonment of the transplantation projects, but an open-mindedness
about its efficacy and continuous appraisal and restructuring to accommodate it more readily to the needs of the society it seeks to serve: transplanting legal structures from one society to another ought to be viewed
in the nature of experimentation. The counter to this response is how
much should be spent in this transplantation process? The price will be
paid not by the theorists and laboratory technicians, nor perhaps by those
in the upper echelons of the receiving society, but unquestionably by the
poor, the disadvantaged, and the excluded in those societies; that is by
those who are least insulated from the buffeting winds of change and
experimentation.

"s3 Several U.S. General Accounting Office reports prepared for the U.S. Senate in
the context of legislation on foreign assistance reviewed the work of the U.S. Agency
for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Department of
State, and the U.S. Department of Justice to promote the rule of law as part of the
transformations in the changing societies of Latin America and Eastern Europe. See
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters: Foreign Assistance, Promoting Judicial
Reform to Strengthen Democracies (Document B/252458 U.S. GAO-NSIAD Sept. 1,
1993).
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4. The Causation Difficulty
The most central but least understood aspect of the relationship
between law and development is the extent to which development is
predictably responsive to law. It is a central question because proponents
of law and development view law in purposive terms. Law's utility lies
in its capacity to affect development positively. This means that the idea
of a relationship should not be taken on faith, but must be demonstrated.
The liberal legalists of the early law and development movement was
foundered upon this premise. The currdnt movement, on the other hand,
buoyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the abandonment of the
socialist models of production, distribution, and central planning by
Communist and post-colonial states alike, together with privatization and
other market-based approaches to economic transactions, is content to
assert without explanation the correlation of law and development. Aside
from the intellectually unsatisfactory consequence of this approach, recent
developments demonstrate its shortcomings.
Neither the substantial economic transformations in such diverse
environments as Argentina and the People's Republic of China, nor the
back-tracking in the economic policies of Sub-Saharan African states, are
explained by a self-evident relationship between law and economic
success. There is simply no getting around the need to make some sense
of the relationship, for integrally central to our occupation as scholars,
and policy makers is the belief that facts are silent without
lawyers,
15 4
theory.
Making sense of the relationship of law to development involves at
least three distinct processes. First, there is the need to articulate one's
conception of law. There is nothing static or global about law as a
cultural phenomenon. Our understanding of law is contingent upon the
Western experience and its effects on development in newly industrializing countries must be equally contextual. Second, there is the need to
identify the applicable conception of development; the advancement of
which is sought by the invocation of law. Finally, there is the need to
articulate the nature of causal linkages. It is highly unlikely that given the
contingencies of what constitutes law, and what we define as development, there would be but one set of linkages. Indeed, the central role of
law and development studies lies in discriminating among various linkages that ought to be deemed relevant in a particular circumstance.
It may be obvious, but nonetheless essential, to note that the spheres
within which we seek to understand the interplay of law and development
114

See

JOHN KEEGAN, HISTORY OF WARFARE 6 (1993) (paraphrasing F.A. Hayak).
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are not infinite. We do not today inquire into the hierarchies of religious
faiths and the relevance of law for the development or furtherance of the
preferred faiths."' 5 By contrast, we lack a similar deference to the possibility of the existence of differing conceptions of what constitutes the
development of the economic and political order of a society. We endow
these latter with a universalist cast, and we experience little difficulty
speaking of law and development with the unmistakable hierarchical
premise that their operation in some societies is superior to their workings
in other societies. What explains this difference of treatment? It cannot be
because law is ineffectual in its interaction with the one, but instrumental
in organizing the other. Surely in both, law operates as a cultural phenomenon, helping to structure, suppress, or promote the hierarchies. The
choice then to focus on economic and political issues in the discussion of
law and development cannot be explained by the claim that law is
instrumental with regard to these, but not in the context of other sociocultural practices. Nor can the focus on economic and political development be justified by the quantifiable impact of law on these endeavors.
The difficulty of quantifying the relationship has formed much of the
criticism of the effort to articulate precisely the relationship of law to
development.'56
Rather, the focus on law and development embodies a sometimes
consciously articulated, but more frequently only implicitly assured
conclusion that all people must want development, which by its capacity
to generate and sustain material well-being and stable socio-political order
has proved its superior mettle. In other words, it is not so much that law
demonstrably generates and promotes economic development, as it is that
given the success of Western economic and political performance, it must
follow that Western legal institutions cannot be inimical to such success.
It follows that those seeking but failing thus far to achieve such success,
should take the short-cut of embracing the Western legal framework.

"' The insulation of the substantive validity of religious beliefs from open contestation is itself a temporal and geographical phenomenon contingent on dominant sociocultural ethos in the West. Neither history nor logic preordains the persistence of this
state of affairs, and recent trends of religious fundamentalism in the West, the Islamic
world, and the Indian Subcontinent challenge any such foundational sanctity of religious
beliefs from challenge by intellectual peasants, social conventions, and government
forces. Just as religious beliefs may today be insulated from open cotestation, so also
have other cultural phenomena in the past including medical practices, politics, philosophy, and law.
'
Cf. Trubek, Short Happy Life, supra note 2 (presenting the views of one
participant in the early stages of the law and development movement).
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This approach must be resisted. The mere juxtaposition of institutions
does not establish a causal link among institutions. The failure of Communist societies no more axiomatically proves that socialist law is anathema to the accumulation of capital, than the success of Japan proves that
centralized or guided administration is essential to capital accumulation.
The recent economic success of some East and Southeast Asian countries
undercuts the claim for a presumptive direct link between legal institutions and practices on the one hand, and preferred economic or political
outcomes on the other. 57 The conclusion is thus inescapable that the
conventionally articulated linkage between law and development is not so
much a logically derived causal one, as it is that success justifies all.'
This raises the issue whether it is meaningful to decipher rational
relationships between law and development. The study of law and development can be descriptive. One can assay the cultural, political, social,
and economic environment within which particular institutions function.
But the undertaking, so construed, will likely circumscribe the observer's
latitude and capacity to make prescriptive statements about the interactions
of these institutions.'59 This has been the fundamental teaching of the

See generally EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 129.
However, this is not the same as arguing that there are no linkages between
social and institutional structures on one hand, and economic and political performance
on the other. The point being made is that the mere existence of one does not without
more foreshadow the other. Further, and without in any way understating the economic
triumph of East Asian economies, the recent revelations of the pervasiveness of corrupt
practices within the regimes of the Korean political economy and the relatively untested
emergence of political pluralism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, and its virtual
absence in Indonesia and Singapore, should give pause to those who cite the East
Asian example as illustrative of the successful transplantation of Western European and
North American economic or political paradigms to emerging societies.
" Professor Crawford Young has pointed out that in the 1960s there was a similar
despair about the economic prospects of many East Asian economies as there is today
about Africa.
[T]he international development community had regarded South Korea as hopelessly corrupt and singularly unpromising. The Pierson Committee Report had concluded that it
seemed doomed to permanent dependence on foreign aid with no possibility of achieving a high growth rate from its own resources. Critics could point to almost every
abuse in the catalogue: there was serious corruption; there was inflation; the aid
dialogue was most acrimonious; and export of the country's own products were low.
Young, supra note 50, at 7.
59 This incapacity does not obviate the need for the interpreter to articulate
normative goals. The interpretive process is impossible without the existence of such a
mindset. See Chibundu, supra note 2, at 1445. Similarly, this is not an argument
against theory. Rather, it is an argument against certain types of theory, essentially
those of a heuristic character.
'
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work1 of even highly renowned observers and analysts like Max Weber. 60
The point is not that there is no connection between law and devel-

opment, but rather that there are numerous and varied connections not

easily pigeonholed into existing classifications.16 ' Equally important,
these relationships are generally dynamic." The argument is not against
trying to understand and influence these connections, nor is it an argu-

ment for unbounded eclecticism; it is an argument against insisting in the
wake of the quest for predictability and certainty that square pegs fit into

round holes. Understanding the relationship of law in development
requires not so much embarking on a predestined voyage of discovery
framed in the classical scientific mode of hypothesis formation and
demonstration of causal linkages, as much as it embraces the classical

" See Trubek, Max Weber on Law, supra note 146 (providing a brief synopsis of
Max Weber's work).
161 This argument is different from the liberal paradigm which, while recognizing the
interplay of several forces, invariably seeks to dichotomize them, and spends much
energy seeking to explain how those two intersect or interact. Cf. APrTr supra note
23, at 24 (discussing the concept of the "double market" in political economy, where
the idea of choice is said to work systematically on the basis of information available
through intersecting and mutually compensating systems, but which are nonetheless
classifiable as economic or political).
16 It might be argued that there are core elemental legal concepts such as the protection of rights to private property that are essential to development. See, e.g., Epstein,
supra note 148, at 562-63. Such a broad framing of the issue is not helpful. No
contemporary society completely denies protection to private property ownership, and it
is doubtful whether any can. On the other hand, there is no indication that the level
of development in a given society can be correlated to the level of protection afforded
private property. Many developing African, Latin American, and Asian countries afford
at least as much protection to private ownership and property control as do many
developed countries of Western Europe. Nor is the lack of enforcement of the laws on
the books a satisfying distinction. Aside from the difficulty of quantifying enforcement
and compliance, there is no evidence that rigid enforcement is any more conducive to
development than flexibility of administration. Indeed, many have suggested that Japanese success reflects precisely the willingness of the bureaucracy and the society to
implement policies notwithstanding formal laws. See, e.g., Michael K. Young, Judicial
Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute
Resolution in Japan, 1995 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1995) (reviewing literature on the use
of administrative guidance defined as "when administrators take action of no coercive
legal effect that encourages regulated parties to act in a specific way in order to realize
some administrative aim"). In this context, it is worth noting that some of the most
rapid developments in the United States occurred in the last third of the nineteenth
century, at a time when it can hardly be said that rigorous enforcement of the laws
was the norm.
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legal methodology of interpretation. 6 3 In this sense, legal methodology
has as much to offer to development studies as do economics and political science.
What are the connections? The central point about law and development is that economics and political science are part of the same cultural
environment within which persons and institutions interact. Both seek an
expansive understanding of those interactions, and similarly attempt to
shape those interactions. The starting point of reference must be that the
study of the reflexive influences of law on development, the impact of
individuals on institutions, the engagements of the state with society, and
of society with the state, are not likely to be of much use unless they are
undertaken within the living cultural settings of the society under study.
The failure to give effect to this point uniformly was the fundamental shortcoming of liberal legalists, pragmatic internationalists, and dependency theorists. The liberal legalists, for example, saw the derivation of
legal principles as exclusively a function of an international legal order,
and the conception of development as a shared undertaking in which
national aspirations must be molded and translated into international
socio-economic constructs. Pragmatic internationalists on the other hand,
focused exclusively on the international character of law and development,
paying little or no attention to the particular national and sub-national
forces that shape the cultural settings within which law, politics, and
economics interact. While the dependency theorists correctly understood
the relevance of internal cleavages to economic and political development,
their analysis fell short because they sought to explain those links almost
exclusively in terms of international power structures. Moreover, they did
not seek to relate the economic and political structures to any legal order
other than raw power. The affirmative argument here is that because the
relationship of law to development is culturally determined, any effort to
understand that relationship must focus on the internal cultural structures
of the society. External influences affect internal cultures, but they are
rarely the primary determinants of cultural relationships. Ultimately, the
particular day-to-day existence of people, their struggles for scarce
resources, the availability and abundance of social distractions, and the
internecine quest for power and dominance, motivate and channel the
structure and principles of a legal order, as well as socio-economic and

" Cf. APTER, supra note 23, at 14 (reconceptualizing development studies with an
emphasis on transdisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary studies, and a focus on
interpretation rather than science); id. at 22 (describing the phenomenal approach in
social and linguistic discourse that "the way actions are interpreted, described to other
people, used to think past current predicaments, to project solutions, is itself 'action").
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political development. It is these considerations that ought to dictate the
nature and direction of future inquiries into law and development.
B. Reconceptualizing the State: Law and Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa
It is clear that understanding the nature of the contemporary African
state is a core task of any revitalized law and development discipline.
While political scientists and international relations scholars in recent
years have turned extensive attention to the nature of the state, revealing
its essential attribute as in large measure a legal construct, and therefore
highly contingent and manipulable," legal scholars have explored it
only in the most cursory of fashions. The standard perspectives have been
formed in the crucible of ethnic struggles or nationalism. While these no
doubt have relevance for law and development studies, they are insufficient pillars for the project.
As a preliminary matter, the international relations scholars' focus on
interstate relations means that the understanding of the state is often
undertaken in terms of the role domestic actors play in shaping interstate
relations. The state is generally taken as a given; it is evaluated in terms
of its role vis-A-vis other actors. While this neo-realist approach is certainly an improvement over the traditional realist approach, it forms little
basis for a rejuvenated law and development curriculum.'" It offers
little not already encapsulated in the pragmatic internationalist perspective
of international business lawyers, which is intellectually unsatisfactory and
pragmatically shortsighted.
Political scientists increasingly have undertaken to explore the nature
of the state by diagnosing the power relationships among the component
parts. Under this approach, the state is viewed as the product of
See, e.g., Young, supra note 50; THE PRECARIOus BALANCE, supra note 151;
(Zaki Ergas ed., 1987); John Gerard Ruggie,
Territorialityand Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in InternationalRelations, 47 INT'L
ORG. 139 (1993). The return to the understanding of state craft or neo-realism in
international relations studies represents acknowledgement of the limitations of regime
or institutional cooperation analysis for understanding international relations. See, e.g.,
ROBERT D. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY 7-11 (1984); Friedrich Kratochwil, Of
Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality, 39 WORLD POL. 27 (1986); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law Historiography, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 717, 717 (1995).
'" Cf. John Gerard Ruggie, The False Premise of Realism, 20 INT'L SECURITY 62
(1995) (criticizing the neo-realist approach from an anti-institutionalist standpoint).
'
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pluralistic competition among various groups. In many ways, this approach is the liberalizing of the radical dependency school approach,
shunned of its particularistic ideological underpinnings. Best represented
in mainstream legal scholarship by public choice theory, the approach
may prove to be of some use to law and development scholarship, but it
clearly suffers from significant shortcomings." This theory assumes that
social interaction is motivated by the desire to obtain control over the
state. This proposition, at least in the context of developing societies and
especially of contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, is questionable, and to
accept it at face value evades a necessary inquiry.
What is the nature of the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African state? It
is certainly in part a geographical expression that mediates between the
interests of people and institutions living within specified territorial
boundaries and those who live without. How well it performs this task
may be subject to debate, but the parameters of this outward facing task
are well-defined, and the obligations and rights that it entails are reasonably well-acknowledged. 7 Thus, there is virtually no doubt as to the
capacity and competence of the African state to determine issues of
naturalization: to raise and maintain a standing army; to regulate external
trade and tariffs; to license and control foreign investment and immigration; to levy and collect taxes on trades and manufactures; to regulate
money supply and credit; and to enter into foreign or international agreements, treaties, and conventions with foreign governments, institutions,
individuals, and international bodies. In short, the African state is a potent
arbiter of external relations and those aspects of the domestic economy
that are directly related to external relations. These are the so-called
formal or modem sectors of the post-colonial state." Not surprisingly,
the institutions underpinning these sectors of society were either directly
bequeathed to the independent African states by former colonizers or have
been fashioned to maintain cooperative relationships with other states and
'" Public choice theory reflects the belief that the economic theory of rational
consumer choice can be used to explain political behavior in a pluralist society,
especially with regard to legislative and administrative processes. For the underlying
theories and their application to emerging issues in international political economy, see
Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, Path-Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition in Russia, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 379 (1995).
67 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 75. The seeming internal disintegration of states
such as Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Zaire has popularized the notion of the failed
state. See generally Jennifer A. Widner, States and Statelessness in Late TwentiethCentury Africa, DAEDALUS Summer 1995, at 129 (distinguishing between failed and
collapsed states and proposing remedies for the former).
"~ But see Young, supra note 50, at 4-5 (citing some African scholars who contend
that the state has failed to discharge its tasks internally and externally).
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international bodies. They appear to be instances of successful transplantation, and their legitimation is derived less from their functional effectiveness or broad internal acceptance, as from their recognition by the
foreigners with whom they deal.
But the capacity to participate in interstate relations or to regulate
economic activities have never been considered to exhaust the scope of
state activity nor to define the boundaries of its sphere. Indeed, the idea
of the state as articulated by its earliest Western proponents found its
mainstay in the relationship of the individual or subject to the state or
sovereign . " It is the form and character of that relationship within the
contemporary Sub-Saharan African society, and how it relates to the role
of other institutions within the society which have begun to take on theoretical significance under the nomenclature of civil society that law and
development must come to grips. That relationship is neither clear nor
straightforward, but it is precisely the ambiguity that makes the understanding critical both to the discipline of law and development and to the
maturation of the African state. While a conclusive exploration of the
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, what follows sketches some
possible ramifications.
1. The Social Context of the Post-Colonial African State
If the creation of artificial nation states is the lasting legacy of
colonization, the centralization of governmental functions among a narrow
cadre of people within a few geographical power centers is the defining
feature of the post-colonial African state." This obvious potential for
the concentration of coercive power is amplified by the remarkable
aggrandizement of the roles this archetypal state has assigned to itself
under the guise of promoting national development. The state has not
merely purported to regulate economic activities, but has become a direct
and dominating participant in all segments of social and economic life,
including: the direct provision of primary, secondary, and post-secondary
education; culture, including ownership and control of most of the media
in a variety of electronic, wireless, print, and theatrical forums; and
ownership and control of economic resources in virtually all industries
including mining, manufacturing, agriculture, transportation, insurance, and
banking. The state frequently exercised its control in direct competition
with and to the displacement of private providers.

'6

See generally FRANCIS HENSLEY, SovE EGNTY 144-57 (1986).

170

See, e.g., Wunsch & Olowu, supra note 101, at 4-5; Young, supra note 50, at

194-95.
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The effect might appear to create vigorous competition among groups
within these states for control of the levers of state power. There is,
however, equally persuasive evidence to the contrary. What is remarkable
about most post-colonial African states is not the level of electioneering
politics, violence, or political strife expected from vigorous competition,
but the relative absence of these elements.' 7 ' Nor can the occasional
quest for power within the African state be readily explained in standard
or institutionalized terms; mechanisms for aggressive peaceful competition
are rarely to be found in any systematic study of the African state.
What accounts for this transparent lack of competition for the levers
of state power? At its core, this state of affairs challenges the assumption
that the character of the relationship between African societies and the
African state replicates those relationships as they exist in the West, or
that the African existence is simply Western existence gone awry. Is it
possible that post-colonial African societies are not simply poor imitations
of Western societies? That they are not hybrids of the native and the
foreign, but that colonialism created a distinct and independently intelligible society whose interaction with the state cannot be surmised by a
simple analogy from Western experience?
Consider one distinction. Whatever else may be said about African
states, they are not the product of social revolutions.'" Unlike most
European and two-thirds of the North American states, African states have
not emerged as the triumph of a particular ideology about the nature of
the individual or the individual's relationship to society, the composition
of society, or institutions within society. 73 Yet, more than in most other
regions of the world, the African state stands out as an autonomous entity, and did so even as it absorbed the functions of social organizations

'

Africa's history has been marked by civil wars, but putting aside the wars for

succession to the post-colonial state as in Angola and Mozambique -

and arguably,

the very muddled cases of Chad and Uganda - these wars, prior to the mid-1980s,
have not been about who controls the central state, but about the right to secede from
the state. Biafra, Katanga, and Southern Sudan are illustrations in point. These should
be contrasted with the trend of more recent civil wars such as those in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Somalia that appear to be genuinely about control of the state itself, not
its break-up.
" Whether one views the decolonization process as a revolution, the African state
was hardly forged by that process. With few exceptions, the post-colonial African state
is a direct successor to a colonial administrative unit. With the arguable exception of
Cameroon, none was the product of any grassroots social or political movement.
''
Compare LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM 2 (1992) with SKOCPOL, supra note 71,
at 29.
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and competing institutions within society." Possible explanations for
this relative autonomy are not difficult to embrace.
Colonial in origin, the state lacked any root in the experiences or
concerns of the indigenous peoples of the territories over whom it imposed order. Professor Skocpol's memorable assertion could not have rung
truer as the definition of the colonized African state than it did for the
societies she was analyzing:
The state, properly conceived, is no mere arena in which socio-economic
struggles are fought out. It is rather a set of administrative, policing and
military organizations headed, and more or less co-ordinated by an
executive authority. Any state, first and fundamentally, extracts resources
from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and
administrative organizations."
Nor did political independence substantially change the nature of the
state. Although social institutions like trade unions, teachers and students,
journalists, and similarly unorganized but self-identifiable groups played
significant roles in the decolonization process, they never effectively
constituted alternative power centers to the state, nor did they ever
vigorously challenge the state for control. These institutions and groups
were themselves imports that had penetrated only slightly into the social
and cultural fabric of society. They represented the interests of small
groups of persons whose allegiance to the new order was at best tentative, but for the most part unformed.
The military was the one institution that made a strong bid for
control of the state, and it obtained control without much opposition from
other possible power centers. The military then systematically reduced the
other social institutions to impotence and undermined any claim of the
state as a representation of society. The praetorian state that thus emerged
was itself a reflection of the experiences of the society, but it failed to
embody its aspirations. Incapable of delivering on those aspirations, the
state generated internecine struggles among the very limited circle of
people who gained control. Entirely lacking were any conflicts about the
identity, nature, or structure of the state itself.
When in the late 1980s there were stirrings of popular uprisings in
much of Africa, there seemed to be the potential for genuine social up-

'74 Cf. SKOCPOL,

supra note 71, at 29 (stating that "state organizations are at least

potentially autonomous from direct dominant class control").
'15 Id; but see S. N. SANGMOAN, PsEuDO-CAPrALiSM AND THE OvERPoLrrICIzE=
STATE 3 (1994) ("The state is a set of relationships and interactions among social
classes and groups that is organized, sustained and regulated by political power.").
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heavals, transformations that may well be essential for the establishment
of the identity of a state. Whether these represent a new beginning with
renewed possibilities is at least subject to debate, but they suggest the
possibilities for a quite different relationship of society to the state than
that reflected by the movements for independence and the various military
coups d'etat. Much will depend on the extent to which these new
movements reflect efforts by bodies with substantial roots in the society
to employ the state as a tool in their daily experience; not to overthrow
the state, nor to refrain from interaction with it, but to make use of it.
How susceptible to their manipulation the state is will itself depend on
how readily the autonomous institutions of the state are capable of
adapting to the particularized needs of the societies. If the focus remains
external - a high likelihood given the drive for economic growth and
the underlining state ideology of capital accumulation - then the chances
are fairly small. If these uprisings, on the other hand, reflect an effort by
social movements within Africa to employ the state to realize normative
visions for their societies (and the willingness to do so notwithstanding
short-run hardships) then the prospects would appear to be much brighter.
Which of these tendencies the uprisings reflect is beyond the scope of
this Article, but as suggested below, they should be the concern of law
and development scholars.
If neither the people nor the institutions of a society readily identify
with the state, such a failure must have significance for the study of law
and development. The effect on our understanding of law is virtually
axiomatic; whether we consider law in the narrow sense of the command
of the sovereign or in the much broader sense of the norms, standards,
and procedures flowing from the experiences of a community."7 We
may expect that if the relationship of the people to the state is passive,
law will be manifested as an alien presence, generally benignly ignored,
occasionally heeded when to do so imposes no meaningful costs, and
adhered to only when to ignore it would be supremely foolish. A passive
relationship of the people to the state thus implies that much of life's
activities will be organized outside of the formal legal regime; i.e., those
norms, standards, and procedures recognized and accorded legitimation by
the state. This is precisely the sort of relationship that appears characteris-

76 Compare Nyang'oro, supra note 131, at 23 with Widner, supra note 131, at 1-2
See also Jean-Germain Gros, supra note 137 (discussing the difficulties of establishing
a multiparty institutional structure in Cameroon).
77 See generally Kuper & Kuper, supra note 37 (analyzing the different conceptions
of law). Cf Chibundu, supra note 2, at 1445-46 (positing "that the use of structure in
interpretive theory permits the functional alignment of fluctuating humanistic values to
rules of law").
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tic of law and state relations in contemporary African societies. It is also
reasonable to expect that an activist involvement of society and the state
will generate a distinctly different impact for law on development." In
the latter situation, the rule of law becomes not an abstract chant, but a
living concept shaped and molded to address the needs of the participatory community.
2. The State, the Rule of Law, and the Law of Rules
The rule of law like free market and democracy has become a
talismanic phrase easily brandished as good by advocates of the new law
and development creed, but rarely defined. It is assumed to exist and to
operate in the successful Western and industrialized societies, and presumably absent but worthy of importation into impoverished societies. Moreover, like democracy and the free market, it would appear that as long as
the rule of law is deemed to be present, its specific contours are quite
irrelevant to development. It is therefore not the quantity or quality of the
rule of law that matters, but its sheer presence. Notwithstanding the
likelihood that for most of its proponents, the invocation of the phrase
amounts to no more than a rhetorical flourish intended to assert a cultural
difference, the term is worth taking seriously because it suggests the possibilities
and limitations of a law-based approach to issues of develop179
ment.

Whatever may be its ultimate scope, the rule of law conveys itself
as a counter proposition to arbitrary rule or rule by caprice." It is a
statement of the supremacy of law over personal rule or expedient
politics. As such, the rule of law acts to restrain the exercise of power by
imposing the need for accountability on those who employ power in the

" Cf. supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (presenting as one model of the
relationship of law to development, the views of Hernando de Soto and his Institute for
Liberty).
Cf Bernard J. H-ibbitts, Albert Van Dicey and the Rule of Law, 1994 ANG.OAMERCAN L. REv. 1, 26 (stating that "the Rule has attained a status in the legal mind
more befitting an article of faith than a doctrinal construct .. . less of an a priori
truth than a reflection of past political considerations").
" This definition of the rule of law dismisses the idea that the rule of law should
be viewed as synonymous for law and order. See J. B. Ojwang & G. Kamau Kuria,
The Rule of Law in General and Kenyan Perspectives, 7-9 ZAMBIA LJ. 109, 110
(1975-77).
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name of the public good.'' The rule of law is thus a particular application of a much broader and ancient concept."'
The critical question raised by the concept is not whether power or
arbitrariness should be checked, but what makes the rule of law a preferred means for doing so. 83 Part of the answer lies in the origins of
the modem conception of the rule of law, and some part in the means by
which we attempt to give the concept concrete reality.
The modem conception of the rule of law derives from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century movements in Anglo-American
legal scholarship to convey the operation of law, law-making, and functioning of the legal system as scientific processes governed by ascertainable and predictable rules. 8 4 The rule of law, as the embodiment of
governance by fixed principles rather than the discretion of political
expediency, fits into this mode by serving, in the view of its best known
exponent of that period, Albert Venn Dicey, three functions."s
First, it checks the arbitrariness of state officials by subjecting
governmental action to scrutiny under "regular law; that is, the legal
principles developed by common law courts in common law adjudication
rather than by specialized tribunals staffed by governmental functionaries."' Second, the conduct of individuals in a society is governed
solely by such regular law duly enacted or formally pronounced through
these appropriate channels. Third, the rule of law serves to affirm that
certain fundamental, individual, or private rights while they may depend
on the government for their enforcement, exist beyond transient governmental action, at least once they have been confirmed to exist by the
judiciary.

"' This feature has led even a well-known historian of left-wing leanings to term
the rule of law an "unqualified good." See E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS
266-67 (1975).
" Cf. Hibbitts, supra note 179, at 26, 26 n.86 (tracing the idea of the rule of law
back to Brachton who in 1258 had declared that the King was under "God and law").
"8Humankind has developed numerous approaches to checking despotism beyond the
rule of law. Others that come to mind include revolutions, appointments, or elections
to fixed terms of office, diffusions of power among social institutions such as the
religious and the secular, monarchies and oligarchies, and contemporary constitutionalism
grounded on the idea of the separation of powers.
84 See generally Robert W. Gordon, 94 HARv. L. REv. 903 (1981) (reviewing G.
EDWARD WHITE, TOWARDS LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY) (asserting

that late nineteenth century legal academics were inspired by the generally prevailing
ideal of scientific endeavors). See also J.B. Ojwang & G. Kuria, supra note 180.
,85See Hibbitts, supra note 179, at 18.
6 See id. at 24-25 (citing Albert Venn Dicey's teachings).
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What is evident from these principles is that the rule of law was
defined more by what it opposed than what it created. Hardly surprising,
it was a principle rooted in the politics of the day, both societal and
professional." In both England and the United States, the last quarter
of the nineteenth century witnessed a valiant effort by common law courts
to assert the supremacy and legitimacy of judge-made laws over the
encroaching law-making functions of legislative and administrative bodies.
For Dicey, for example, the rule of law was an argument for judge-made
law which in his view was more likely to protect cherished societal
interests such as individual freedoms than was the legislature.' This, he
thought, was more likely to be the case given judicial independence and
the logic, symmetry, and certainty that he contended were features of
common law adjudication." 9 Furthermore, this claimed virtue of common law adjudication itself reflected the professional contestation taking
place among legal educators; the superiority of formal legal education at
universities over the practical methodology of legal apprenticeships." 9
How contingent on political expediency our understanding of the
concept of the rule of law is, is fully borne by definition of the term as
rule by judges rather than by legislators. Surely, none of the current
proponents of the concept and its extension to developing societies mean
to imply that judge-made law is preferable to legislative or administrative
decision-making for being more predictable, more scientifically based,
more protective of property interests, or otherwise more likely to spur
economic, political, or social development.
What then do current proponents of the rule of law as a necessary
component of development mean to suggest? Three possibilities warrant
some attention. First, they may mean the existence of specific rules or
laws that further development. Second, they may be referring to the
values embedded in the procedural aspects of regularized law-making and
law-enforcement. Finally, it may be an assertion of the benefits of
institutionalizing the mechanisms and processes of law-making, law
interpreting, and law-enforcement. Are these objectives consistent, and can
they be squared with the reality of development?
Much of the renewed interest in law and development continues to
focus on the adoption, enactment, or promulgation of specific statutes or
rules as the statement of the relationship of law to development. In the

7

"

Id. at 23.

See, e.g., id. at 27 (contending that Dicey's definition and invocation of the rule

of law reflected popular prejudices which gave his principle an added attraction as a

statement of valid English law).
"' See id. at 17.
'9 See id. at 23.
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economic area, for example, laws on title to property, taxation, foreign
investment, privatization, and the regulation of securities markets and
corporate governance continue to be advocated on highly specific grounds
as essential to economic performance and growth in the new world
order.'9 ' The advancement of specific constitutional formulae also characterizes proposals on political development. But this approach to law and
development is hardly new, and despite claims that the new approach has
learned from the past, that the current focus is on constitutive rather than
specific rules, or that the new political environment for global capitalism
assures success where the old Cold War militated against it, these are
illusory claims. Indeed, specific area studies, notably in Central and
Eastern Europe as well as in Africa, indicate that persistence in transferring specific substantive rules and processes from the West will not
do.'" Given the lack of uniformity of substantive rules among concededly successful industrial societies, the reality that rules flow from and
seek to reproduce the particular temporal and spatial experiences of a
given society, and the clear absence of any confirmed understanding of
the causal links between legal rules and development, it is fair to say that

For a discussion on the law on private property, see Note, Russian Property Law,
Privatization, and the Right of "Full Economic Control," 107 HARv. L. REv. 1044
(1994) ("Property law is central to economic, political, and legal reform in post-Soviet
Russia. A stable system of private property promotes efficiency and prosperity in a
market-based economy and is crucial to the development of a democracy."); see also
Im Reisman, Note, The World Bank and The IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 349 (1992); but see Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of
Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995).
For a discussion on taxation, see, e.g., Edward H. Lieberman, Russia Modernizes
Its Tax System, But Ghosts of the U.S.S.R. Still Haunt, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 32 (1993).
For information on foreign investment, see, e.g., Gray & Jarosz, supra note 148
(discussing foreign investments in Central and Eastern Europe); Note, Protection of
Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam - A Case Study, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994).
For scholarship on privatization, see, e.g., Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and
How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 23 (1992); J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Order From Disorder: The Development of the Russian Securities
Markets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509, 514-15 (1995); Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania
M. Frankowska, Prohibitions Against Insider Trading in the United States and the
European Community: Providing Guidance for Legislatures of Eastern Europe, 12 B.U.
INT'L LJ. 91 (1994); but see Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of
State Property in Post-SocialistEconomies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L. J. 131, 152 (1993).
'2 See, e.g., JOAN M. NELSON ET AL., INTRICATE LINKS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
MARKET REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE 12-16 (1994).
191

19971

LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

239

conceiving the rule of law in terms of specific substantive rules of
conduct is at best an incomplete undertaking.193
But many insightful commentators have gone beyond equating the
rule of law and its relevance for development with specific substantive
rules, and rather, have suggested that its force lies in the procedural
rectitude that the regime brings to bear on the use of power. For such
proponents, law in development means promoting those mechanisms that
emphasize and assure the channelling of administrative fiat, affording all
actors equal opportunity or access to decision-making, routinized processing and adjudication of claims, and judicial independence from the
political branches. These abstract propositions may be worthy goals and
objectives, although this claim should not be accepted independent of the
setting against which they are judged. It is possible that development,
defined in terms of economic prosperity and political stability, might well
be furthered by legal regimes possessing these attributes. Substantially
more difficult, however, is fashioning tile implementing doctrines by
which these objectives may be realized. Operational rules for administrative agencies and the courts have not been shown to be any more effective in constraining the exercise of discretion than have been substantive
rules, nor is it clear why they should be.1" Indeed, as American experience amply demonstrates, the line between procedural guarantees and
substantive rules and norms is elusive.19
To avoid this difficulty, the tendency among new practitioners of law
and development is to focus on the seminal importance of people and
institutions in the development process. They contend that procedural
rectitude can be built into national development through the education of
policy and decision-makers. The legal training of judges, lawyers, and
bureaucrats, the provision to courtrooms of equipment, and even the
training of administrative staff in mundane administrative tasks, are now
viewed as essential elements of the legal transplantation project.

"' Although the United States experience is generally advanced as the model of the

role of law in capital formation and dissemination, there is little doubt that the model
differs significantly from those of other societies such as the French, German, Japanese,
and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia. The rules on ownership, planning,
corporate governance, credit allocation, capital mobility, and overall government
intervention differ markedly among these societies. Nor can the political systems in
these countries be said to be in any meaningful sense shared.
" See, e.g., Bryde, supra note 33, at 180-88 (discussing efficiency problems in

administrative law).
" See, e.g., Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Delinking Disproportionalityfrom Discrimination:
Procedural Burdens as Proxy for Substantive Visions, 23 N.M.L. REv. 87 (1992).
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In focusing on practitioners within the judicial and administrative
bureaucracies, a distinction is drawn between the new programs and those
that failed in the 1960s and 1970s. The claim is that the latter focused on
scholars, lawyers, and theories, while the current approach engages
practitioners and administrators in the project of institutionalizing legal
practice. A third conception of the rule of law as an instrument of
development focuses on law's role in creating and maintaining distinct
separation or spheres of power. In particular, the rule of law seeks to
constrain the arbitrary exercise of power by maintaining specified functions within specific institutions. The classic triarchy is the judicial,
executive, and legislative. There is no reason, however, why the rule of
law should operate solely in this context. The phenomenon of the independent agency in the United States, or the even more elementary division between public and private ordering of rules, suggest additional
possibilities."9 Thus, in the African context, the division of power between central and local governments, or between traditional and modem
rulers are plausible illustrations. What the rule of law insists is not so
96 There is no legal definition of the independent administrative agency, and its
status in U.S. law is the subject of much commentary. Yet, the United States would
be a significantly different society today if independent administrative agencies ceased
to exist. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory
Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L. 252, 252 (questioning the independence of independent
agencies); cf. Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of
Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 4 YALE J.
REG. 363, 364 (1987) (arguing that the legitimacy of the independent agency is ensured
by the U.S. Constitution's necessary and proper clause).
The reasoning and significance of the public/private dichotomy is a pervasive issue
in all branches of contemporary American legal disciplines, but the issues are perhaps
most illuminatingly tackled in the ongoing debate as to the definition of the corporate
entity, and therefore, its obligations to the various interests with colorable claims on it.
Much of that discussion has focused on the seemingly abstract question of whether or
not the corporation is a nexus or network of contracts, and whether the standard rules
are simply default or mandatory public rules from which the corporation cannot deviate.
See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economic Structure of the
Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 180 (1992); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407
(1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1416, 1426 (1989) (arguing that contracts between the actors and not corporate
law dictate the arrangements of the firm); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of
Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1449, 1460 (1989) (arguing that the contract and trust metaphors are
each useful in illuminating the weakness of the other, and both point toward the need
for mandatory rules for corporations).
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much the specific allocation of competencies, as that such allocations be
made on principled grounds, and once made, respected and enforced.
The difficulty with this understanding of the rule of law lies not in
the conception itself as in the generation of mechanisms for recognizing
the appropriate spheres of competencies, and for maintaining the separation of powers. Although it is fashionable to use constitution-drafting for
the former purpose, the approach is at best artificial if it does not reflect
both the experiences of the society and the dynamic character of those
experiences. 1" A workable separation of powers doctrine must be sufficiently elastic to permit shifting power structures to be accommodated,
and yet this is itself seemingly antagonistic to the idea of rule of law.
The typical solution to this dilemma is to confer on one branch,
usually the judiciary, the capacity and power to decide authoritatively at
any given time the proper balance of competencies among the spheres.
For this task of judicial review, the judiciary must be endowed with the
necessary political legitimation from the polity, deference to it by the
other branches, and a high level of politically astute and socially sagacious members.19 The availability of these resources is highly cultural
and time-specific, and whether institutionalization of processes and
concepts can respond to these resource demands is an issue the answer to
which is in question. It is noteworthy, however, that the tendency today
among societies seeking to institutionalize the rule of law is to look to
the German and French experiences with constitutional courts and state
councils, respectively.
Whatever the result of this last approach, it is clear that the answer
to the puzzle of the relevance of law for development lies in the internal
structures and politics of the particular society, its resource endowments,
its experiences, and its political and social organizations. There are no
special rules of law, no abstract principles of economics, no substantive
rules of private property foundational to the success of the institutionalization of the rule of law.
To summarize, law possesses a central place in the organization and
structure of all societies, not the least being the developing countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa. It is not merely that in the quest for legitimation, the
post-colonial state seeks to exercise its authority through it, but equally
important, the effectiveness and authority of the state in its internal

'
See, e.g., Chua, supra note 79 (discussing experiences in Latin America and
Southeast Asia).
'9 Cf. JudicialReview and the Lusaka Statement, 38 J. AFR. L. 201, 202-03 (1995)
(claiming for judicial review, the virtues of promoting the rule of law, democratic
governance, human rights, and administrative fairness).
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dealings (that is, the practical existence of the state as contrasted with the
intellectual idea of the state) depends on its capacity to weave social
conventions, traditional structures, and like civil institutions continually
generated in response to defense of state action, into the social legal
framework. Thus, understanding and appraising the contemporary role of
law in African societies must start with the institutionalization of methods
for constructing the appropriate distribution of power among the various
players within the society: the state, local authorities, the bourgeoisie, and
traditional councils.'" Procedural and substantive rules can only be
formulated against the background of such allocations of competencies.
The primary concern of law and development studies at this time must
focus to a much greater extent on understanding African societies and
promoting sensible constructions of the relevant institutions than on
maintaining procedural and substantive rules for protecting particularized
property interests.
C. A Proposed Agenda for the Study of Law and Development in SubSaharan Africa
Societies do not function as autarchies; they borrow from others and
are stimulated by outside exposures. Outside influences, however, are
digested as part of the local story, not as the source of or the substitute
for local experiences. The nature of the African state remains very poorly
understood. The state of necessity anchors many African societies, but it
very much remains an alien presence in those societies. It is the unit of
analysis not because of any inherent properties it possesses, but because
of the illusion that we know what it is. At any rate, it is the one African
institution that to those schooled in Western thought appears most graspable.
But this illusion of understanding is perhaps the most serious barrier
to the study of law and development. The African state is not an unpolished copy of the European or North American equivalent. Notwithstanding popular contention, its variations from the European and North
American models do not merely reflect flaws in the production process.

,'

This Article focuses on state and governmental power. The thesis, however,

potentially has a much broader reach: rather than taking African institutions as a given
on the ground that they must approximate their Western analogs, anyone who wishes
to play a consequential role in the interpretation of African societies needs to analyze
African institutions as products of factors distinct from their Western analogs and more
than mere reproductions of Western institutions in the tropical belt. Instead, African
institutions function to serve the particularized needs, experiences, and aspirations of a
dynamic population.
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The African state may be an artificial creation springing from outside
the society, but like all states, it articulates and represents not only the
interests of its component parts vis-A-vis those of other states, but it also
mediates the competing internal interests of its members. It is these roles,
especially the latter, that structure the state.
To analyze the success of the African state in terms of its capacity
to mediate or regulate internal conflicts by employing the same criteria
used in analyzing European and North American states is to ignore the
relevance of people in structuring the societies that they inhabit. It is
notable that analysts have not faulted the failed African states for their
incapacity to relate at the international level with other states, but for
their incompetence in modulating and regulating issues of internal concern
such as ethnic strife, corruption, administrative effectiveness, and electoral
politics. But these are failures only when juxtaposed against a background
that views the internal structures of Western states as the norm. Shifting
the focus, the perception of failure becomes a descriptive statement of the
struggles of an institution adapting to a complex environment. Rather than
being a failure, the African state becomes an illustration of the dynamic
of the process of institutionalization. That dynamic is powerfully illustrated in the developing literature on the relationship between the patrimonial
exercise of power in African states and the reciprocity-based organization
of exchange characteristic of traditional African societies. The change
of vantage points suggested by the exploration of the interaction of
patrimonialism and reciprocity is offered only as one way by which
contemporary study of the relationship of law to development can be
enriched. This comparative study would enrich law and development, not
as the study of how the rest of the world and Sub-Saharan African

o Patrimonial is an admittedly awkward term to use in describing a governance
regime based on a process of consultation among members of a community. It does,
however, accurately reflect the dominance of males within the system and the ultimate
benevolent despotism that is the product of the consultative process.

The following discussion should not suggest that all African states share one model
of governance because that is clearly not the case. The central theme of this Article is
that we can better understand the significance of law for development if we expend
more energy and resources seeking to understand the varied structures and forms that
governance and social interactions take in African societies.
For a discussion of reciprocal exchange characteristics, see, e.g., Goran Hyden, in
FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE, supra note 104, at 245, 256-58. Reciprocity
essentially denotes a form of exchange that is not contractual. Entitlement of a quo for
a quid is implied, but its enforcement is rarely overt. In a legal culture such as that

to which we are accustomed, one may say that the enforcement mechanism, if any, is
moral. See id. However, the force and potential for communal ostracism belies this
distinction between moral sanction and legal coercion.
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societies in particular can become developed in the Western sense, but as
how appreciation of the internal forces at work in the formation of the
state as an integral part of society can further enhance our understanding
of law as a social force. The result is a fuller articulation of the process
of development, and law's relationship to it.
1. The African State as a Legal Institution
While there have been many internal challenges to the territorial
boundaries of some African states, active or revolutionary struggle for
control of the levers of power is generally scarce. 2" This is an especially significant point given how most of these states were crafted. However,
the lack of conflict over ideology of the state manifests a more pernicious
problem: the passivity of the citizenry is as much a threat to the legitimacy of the African state as would be persistent violence or revolutionary
warfare.
The nonparticipation of the general population in electoral politics;
the autocratic rule of gerontocratic decolonizers and youthful military
men; the apparently unbreakable grip of power by ethnically homogeneous cliques; the control of the dynamic sectors of the economy like
cash crop production, mineral extraction, and manufacturing by a handful
of trading companies all highlight the irrelevance of much of the population to an institution that dominates their lives. The challenge to legitimacy thus comes from the disconnection, and arguably alienation, of the
majority of the population from the state - the de jure African state
lacks the essence of positive nationalism.
A common response of scholars consists either in self-righteously
decrying the persistence of dictatorships in the continent, increasingly
accompanied by demands for punitive action against such dictatorships, or
in the hypocritical wringing of hands in dismay at the dissipation of the
initial promise of decolonization.' Without disputing the accuracy of
the factual underpinnings of these responses, nor endorsing dictatorships
and apathy, these responses are inadequate. The ideal they posit is
uncritically grounded in contemporary Western society and experience.

"' Aside from the wars of national liberation in Southern and Lusophone Africa,
and the ethnic conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda, only Uganda and Algeria (and
plausibly Ethiopia) come to mind as illustrations of internal struggles over the ideology
that should underpin the legitimation and control of state power.
Typically, the demand is for the withholding of foreign aid, the ostracism of the
nondemocratic or human rights violator governments at international conferences, or

economic sanctions against such governments. As of this writing, international movements against Kenya and Nigeria typify these demands.
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The analytical framework is entirely Western, and the prism through
which the facts are viewed makes only the most grudging of concessions
to the demands of day-to-day existence in the social and institutional con-

struction of the African state. We should reject this approach because
social institutions remain mired in the contingencies of the environment
in which they operate and wishing otherwise is an inadequate substitute

for understanding the living environment.
A dictatorship as an unconstrained one-person rule is bad both for
functional and ideological reasons. As an ideological matter, it is the
ultimate in the deification of the ruler and challenges the idea of the
equal dignity of persons. But it is on the functional limitations of dictatorships that the social sciences and law focus. 3 In one word, the
problem is that of accountability.
Different societies at different times have sought to deal with the
desirability of public accountability in a variety of ways. In contemporary

industrial societies, electoral politics in some form is the dominant mode

for assuring accountability. The approach, highly malleable in form and
substance, appears well-suited to the individualist, entrepreneurial, and
pluralist ethos and structure of the industrialized market-oriented nation-

state. ' But while we may idealize electoral politics, it can hardly be
said to exhaust the possibilities for assuring accountability in a soci-

ety.

5

For example, if we posit a society in which rationalistic self-

Although emphasis in the remainder of this section is on the functional argument,
the conclusions would be supported equally well with a focus on the ideological
grounding of state craft.
' Although it is now fashionable to speak of liberal democracies as a unitary
phenomenon, the form of governance that it represents varies widely, ranging from the
republican form of government in the United States to the plebiscitary democracy of
Switzerland; from the winner-take-all constituency politics and purported absolute
supremacy of the British House of Commons, to the proportional representation and
constitutionally regulated sovereignty of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat. These
differences are apparently not irrelevant as demonstrated by the readiness of the U.S.
President to disavow his nomination of a friend to a high position in administration on
the ground that he found unacceptable the friend's proposal that flaws in the U.S.
democratic process that resulted in the under-representation of minorities in political
office could be corrected by the adoption of cumulative voting or other forms of
proportional representation. For classifications of contemporary democratic regimes, see,
e.g., Gregory H. Fox & George Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1,
14-16, 16-17, 69 (1995) (distinguishing between procedural democracy and substantive
democracy, and recommending that where they are in conflict, the latter should be
preferred even if it means negating the former); ROBERT A. DAHL, DIEMMAs OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 108-14 (1982).
2
It would be misleading even in liberal democratic societies to align accountability
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the central tenet of neoclassical Western

liberal social science teaching - is not taken as the organizing hypothesis
of behavior, then not only would accountability not be maximized by
individual-oriented electoral politics, but such a structure might well be
counterproductive.'

In a society characterized by strong familial or collective ties where
production, accumulation, and consumption are based on group rather than
individual efforts, accountability may take the form of avoiding ostracism
rather than obtaining popular approbation. The framework for institutionalizing this mode of accountability will be quite different from electoral
politics. It may, for example, take the form of a deliberative rather than
a representative process. The most important virtue may well be the
capacity to purvey a sense of trustworthiness, rather than that of efficiency. In either case, the mechanism for assuring that power is not arbi-

wholly with the election or democratic regime. Some of the most influential and powerful institutions in these societies are expressly insulated from direct input by the
citizenry, and are nonetheless required to be accountable. Two prominent illustrations
are federal judges and the Federal Reserve Board in the United States and their equivalents in other societies. Nor is it a tenable argument to suggest that the appointment
and removal processes alone explain the means for assuring accountability by these
institutions and those who run them.
For a recent elaboration and critique of this being in the guise of the rational
utility maximizer in theories of economic development, see John Brohman, Economism
and Critical Silences in Development Thought: A Theoretical Critique of Neoliberalism,
16 THRD WORLD Q. 297, 298 (1995).
' The significance of trust in exchange relationships has begun to command
attention in social science literature. See, e.g., Berud Lahno, Trust, Reputation and Exit
in Exchange Relationships, 39 J. CONFL. RESOL. 495 (1995) (explaining how trust
rather than direct rational quid pro quo may form the basis for mutually advantageous
relationships in social settings). Similarly, Professor Robert Cooter has persuasively
argued for a decentralized structural approach to the adjudication of business disputes
under which courts genuinely try to ascertain the internalized norms and customs of a
business community, and then treat those norms and customs as law. See Robert D.
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized
Law, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 215, 226-27 (1994). Central to his argument is the
demonstration that community norms are generated by the maximization of profitability
based on long-term relationships. The stability of these relationships over the long-run
depend on repeated exchanges among members of the exchange community who come
to internalize these norms. See id. at 216.
See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995) (arguing that each culture's social institutions and
collective level of trust in government and social relationships shape the society's
economic framework).
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trarily exercised must in some sense reflect the social structures of the
society within which authority exists, and'in which it is employed.
In our contemporary world, the nation-state constitutes the standard
unit of analysis for the legitimate exercise of authority. While this will be
no less true for African states in the future than it is for others, that role
can only be furthered if it is placed in the context of the African experience. The African state as it has emerged from colonialism is a distinct
break from the pre-colonial African experience. It is not simply that
colonial conquest and rule shaped the physical frontiers of contemporary
African states, but more fundamentally, the method and institutions of
governance brought about by colonial rule were entirely unknown in
virtually all of the colonized African societies.
While it is specious to suggest that pre-colonial African societies
uniformly shared any set of institutions or methods of governance, three
elements of classical state-craft with significance for authoritative state
control were notably absent.' First, there was never a formalized conception of a conclave of entities whose capacity to get along could be
regulated by inter-communal law. In other words, there was no shared
perspective of a world system of hierarchically related sovereigns. Second,
the idea of a bureaucratic form of government did not hold sway. Rather,
governance whether in a despotic monarchy or a freewheeling entrepreneurial acephalous society was highly personal, molded more by the
capacity of personalities than by rationalized administrative cadres.'
Third, the basic foundation of governance was lineage.21 Membership
in a society was dictated by perceptions of kinship and familial ties rather
than of an administrative unit, vocational calling, or deistic belief systems.
Consanguinity, rather than ideology, was thus the decisive organizing
pillar of most pre-colonial African societies.
These considerations are important when juxtaposed against the social
structures along which African societies, independent of the state, are
organized. In recent years, a respectable body of social science research
has argued that the mode of relationships within contemporary African
societies is better understood in terms of reciprocity rather than market
exchange. According to this view, transactions do not go forward on the
basis of instantaneous mutual transfers of bargained-for goods and services characteristic of market-based exchange, but instead are grounded on
the accumulation of non-simultaneous nor necessarily offsetting exchanges
See generally GEORGE AYrrrE, INDIGENOUs AFRICAN INsTrrUtIoNS 71-149 (1991)
(describing the various modes and institutions of governance in indigenous African
societies).
Cf. id. at 77 (providing an example of how African groups chose their leaders).
210 See id.
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reflecting ties of social affection rather than purely economic exchange." In such an environment, collective trust within a community
of shared expectations forms the currency of exchange and shapes the
concept of accountability.
One need not accept the specifics of this argument to endorse its
general thrust.212 Doing so in the African context is less problematic
than in many other situations. Whatever may be the proper mode of production and capital accumulation in Africa today, it can scarcely be
doubted that it differs in significant ways from the modem industrial and
post-industrial processes of Western Europe and North America. There
are, of course, urban centers in African societies whose social structures,
political organization, economic activity, and the daily life of inhabitants
appear to mimic those of metropolitan centers of Western industrial
societies. They look outward across the oceans to Europe and North
America, from where they import not only automobiles, food, clothing,
building materials, but also health care, education, information, culture,
mores, and the technology of production.2" 3 Yet, it should not be forgotten that these urban areas are but small islands in a vast continent
dominated by rural existence where the primary mode of transportation is
walking, in which food consumption is determined almost exclusively by
the quirkiness of seasonal rainfalls, and because the vast majority of the
people are unable to read or write, face-to-face contact remains the
primary mode of communication.214
What is true about the physical dissimilarities between the urban and
rural environments of African societies is equally true about behavioral
patterns and determinative social institutions. The colonial experience was
a momentous one for Africa. It accounts for the current territorial division
of the continent, and for the existence and structure of state power. Many
of the current institutions through which the post-colonial state functions
2.
212

See Hyden, supra note 200, at 253-55.
See WEST AF CA, Nov. 25, 1995, at 1843, 1843 (arguing for the need to probe

and inquire into the structure of social relationships in Africa, especially between rulers
and their kinsmen, but contending that these social relationships have been detrimental
to the securing to Africans of good governance).
213 Cf Thomas Kamm, Epidemic of Slums Afflicts Latin America, WALL ST. J., Aug.
30, 1994, at A6. (describing unstructured and uncontrolled but highly adaptive migration
into cities lacking essential infrastructure in Latin America is equally valid for most
contemporary African societies).
214For an interesting discussion of the significance of the urban/rural divide in the
success of restructuring national societies in contemporary Eastern Europe, see Andr6
Liebich, Nations, States, Minorities: Why is Eastern Europe Different, 42 DISSENT 313,
315 (1995). Unlike Eastern Europe, the problem in Africa is not one of antagonism but
of relative indifference.
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have their foundations in the colonial state. Thus, not only are contemporary instruments of direct coercion, such as the police force and the
military, organizational, and structural reproductions of their colonial
predecessors, but so are other manifestations of state power. the judiciary;
the civil service; revenue collection; modes of information gathering,
dissemination and control; and issuance of licenses for various activities.
Moreover, the active involvement of the state as an owner or manager of
the means of production and accumulation in the economic sphere
through such entities as marketing boards, parastatals, and public utilities,
have their origins in the colonial state.
Notwithstanding these, the colonial state was an orphan state. Having
given birth to it, the political brokers in the mother country mainly
ignored it.21 The colonial office and its cadre of administrative and civil
servants were given a free hand in determining and shaping the colonial
dependencies. In exchange, the colonial office saw to it that the peoples
and politics of the mother country were intruded upon as little as possible
by the needs and demands of the colonial dependencies. Colonial rule
was thus an insular undertaking, generally shielded from public debate
and left in the hands of experts.
In many ways, the formation and institutionalization of the colonial
African state constituted no more than an archetypal legal instrument. The
standard proceeding consisted of requiring local African chieftains to sign
over undefined rights to a representative of a European sovereign in
exchange for an equally vague promise of protection. But the significance
of this document lay more in the effect accorded it by other European
sovereigns than in what it actually said or in the relationship it purported
to create between the signatories. Indeed, neither the African chieftain nor
the European state on whose behalf it was signed had the full-fledged authority or backing of the subjects and citizens on whose behalf these
documents subsequently were to be invoked as establishing legal rights

2"' See generally Young, supra note 51. There were variations among the mother

countries and over time in the level and centrality of attention given to the colonies.

For example, one classic distinction is that between British indirect and French direct
rule. Such differences, however, were more a matter of degree rather than of kind.
Similarly, the contention in the text is not intended to dismiss differences in the
level of penetration into the hinterland that occurred from one territory to another, nor
to deny that interest within the mother country in events within a particular territory
varied with the extent to which European settlements formed part of the local scene
within an occupied African territory. Nonetheless, the interest here is in the colonial or
territory characteristic of most of Sub-Saharan Africa, not with the incidents of
colonized, so that the examples of Algeria, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Angola,

Namibia, and Zimbabwe do not undercut the assertions in the text.
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and disabilities, including, for example, the cession of the independence

of the African signatory entity.2 6
The colonization of African territory and the institutions brought with
it were not the sum total of the African experience during the period of

colonization. For one thing, the colonial experience in most African
countries lasted for barely three-quarters of a century, and its penetration
into the hinterland was at most spotty.21 The colonial state redrew
administrative units, and along with its extensive employment of per
capita taxation, and the introduction and encouragement of the widespread
use of government-backed currencies to facilitate economic exchange,
colonial rule had significant impact on even the most isolated of African
rural communities. In most spheres of life, however, colonial rule had
only marginal effects on the practices and beliefs of the vast majority of
the African population living outside the urban centers and their immediate surroundings. 18
The result was that the African colonial state was sustained by a
small but energetic group of interested bureaucrats, economic entrepreneurs, missionaries, and academics from the mother country, and their
emerging proteges in the colonized societies. The effects of colonial rule
were sometimes harsh, but except in a few population centers, such
effects were primarily sporadic, leaving very few lasting influences on the
domestic institutions of the vast majority of the African population.
As with colonization, the process of decolonization was also highly
formalistic, lacking in those features of broad general participation that
unite a people in a cause, create a sense of national identity, and cement
a nationalist vision. Thus, while there were the occasional general strikes,
the movement for independence again involved a small and select elite on
216
237

See generally Young, supra note 50, at 82-83.
See id. at 9 (stating that "[tihe colonial state in Africa lasted in most instances

less than a century - a mere moment in historical time"). Although the colonization of
Africa by Europe may be traced to the Portuguese occupation of Ceuta in 1415,
sustained and meaningful European subjugation of the continent is generally associated
with Belgium's decision in 1876 to colonize the Congo, and with the Berlin conference
of 1884-1885 that partitioned the continent. See THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE
FOR AFRIcA (1992). The institutionalization of colonial rule occurred over a period of
time, but it was basically complete by the beginning of World War I. But see Young,
supra note 50, at 11 (drawing attention to the proposition that the contemporary postcolonial African state bears much of the weight of the colonial experience); id. at 21822 (explaining the difficulty past-colonial Africa is experiencing in creating an African
civil society).
238 Systems of marriage and divorce, land-ownership, control patterns, lineage,
kinship, hereditary rules, and religious beliefs while not entirely unaffected by the
colonial experience remained unique expressions of African localism.
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both sides of the negotiating table." 9 The result was that the post-

colonial African state took as the norm the administrative and economic
structures prefigured by the colonial experience.

It is thus hardly surprising that the post-colonial African state has
been ineffective in creating and effecting a unified national experience.
The recent delegacies or failures of the African state have not only been

manifested by the absence of any primordial attachment to the state, but
they have been magnified by the resilience of the customary or indigenous African practices and institutions. '
The task for law and development is understanding and articulating

the relevance of these experiences for the formation and institutionalization of viable structures in the contemporary African polity. To this end,
the grounds for the practical legitimation of the state, and the means for
assuring the responsiveness of the state to the interests and preferences of

the population directly implicate our understanding of contemporary
African society. If the patrimonial mode of governance constitutes a
viable and structurally sound approach to accountability in a culture
characterized by collective decision-making and the dominant approach to
decision-making in African societies continues to be collective, then it is

not an answer simply to argue that African societies must adapt to the
dominant mores of the international system by embracing electoral
politics."' We should not accept this answer without further inquiry
even if it is justified by such functionalist arguments as that the adoption
would encourage capital inflows or the incapacities of Africa's patrimonial
systems to check effectively the misuse of power by its leaders. The

difficulty with the answer is that it lacks intimate connection with the

239 Excepting Algeria, the standard process of decolonization in both Anglophone and

Francophone states involved negotiating a constitutional arrangement between the mother
country and a handful of elites in the colonial territory. Only in the Portuguese and
Spanish colonies, and the unique cases of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia did
the independence process involve active warfare which generally led to the mass
mobilization of the subjugated population. In these latter situations, the idea of a
nation-state as more than a formal legal institution is more likely to be embedded in
the daily life of the ordinary people than it is in the former.
n This explains the standard refrain employed by the military to justify their
unconstitutional coups d'etat that the overthrown politicians were disloyal to the state,
and that the society was in an undisciplined process.
For a review of customary practices, see Hyden, supra note 200, at 247, 252. Cf
Howard W. French, Does Sharing Wealth Only Promote Poverty? N. Y. TMES, Jan.
14, 1995, at A5 (describing the continuing vitality even in urban centers such as
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire of traditional African patterns of kinship relations).
" See Hyden, supra note 200, at 260-61.
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regular experiences of the people. We would be substituting a hypothesized ideal for an admittedly flawed reality.
But these are not the only two choices available. Before opting for
one or the other, it is helpful to understand the reasons for the flaw in
the one and the costs of transformation entailed by the other. From such
an understanding, a third possibility can be constructed; one that takes the
experiences of the people as a given, and strives to refashion flawed
institutions to enrich those experiences.
In the context of contemporary African societies, the critical issue is
why both methods for assuring accountability - the patrimonial and the
electoral - are ineffective. The reason for the failure of the electoral
system is self-evident. As proposed to and structured for African societies,
the electoral system is alien. It embodies at most the aspirations of a
small cadre of the population. Although it may be fashionable to embrace
rhetorically, its constraint on the practical exercise of power is eternal and
illusive.
Electoral politics, at least in the idealized form often posited, demands a quite different society than that which is today most common in
Africa. It requires, for example, a self-regarding, individualist orientation
to the use of power;, an environment that views politics in quid pro quo
terms; a vision of politics that celebrates problem solving through conflict
among interest groups; and a pluralism that welcomes the process of
competition as the ultimate statement of the common weal. To make
electoral politics the preferred arbiter of institutional life thus would require fundamental shifts in African attitudes that can come about only
through a different set of experiences than those to which the vast
majority of Africans have been exposed.
But patrimonialism hardly appears to be an acceptable alternative.
The shell of the practice may have its origins in the African experience,
but in today's African society it routinely fails the functional test of
assuring accountability of the ruler. The explanation for this failure is not
too hard to discover. Reasonably well-suited to small, similarly minded
communities, patrimonialism's acknowledged strength of functioning on
the basis of collective consensus is poorly adapted to the needs of a
multi-ethnic and poly-centric state. Yet, those who ascend to power in
these poly-ethnic states, like those over whom they rule, have had their
consciousness molded through this ethos of collective decision-making and
reciprocal accountability. When the methodology fails at the state level,
it is generally not because the leaders are dictators in the sense of
desiring and exercising absolute power, but because there is no institutional mechanism for assuring that the consensual nature of the deliberative process goes beyond those immediately in authority.
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In the classical African community, consensual decision-making
occurred at various interrelated layers.' The family, for example, deliberated as a unit on an issue and reached a decision. That decision was
then taken up by the family representatives at the Village Council. Next,
the representatives of the Village Council again reviewed the matter at a
council of several villages. ' Notably, competence was not based on
functional differentiation among the various deliberative bodies. Moreover,
continuing deliberation within the family and the village council even
when the issue had moved out of their direct control assured that the
ultimate decision was one that reflected and updated the consensus not
simply of the leaders, but of the community. Further, the continuing involvement of the members of the community at large guaranteed that
decision-makers remained aware of the existence of the ultimate sanction
for non-accountability to popular will: the potential for ostracism.
These features of local governance in many African societies are
conspicuously missing in the post-colonial institutionalization of the
decision-making process in the modem nation-state and its use of power.
The post-colonial African political leader typically begins with a consultative council that genuinely tries to identify and implement policies
consonant with popular will. Almost never can such rulers be classified
correctly as dictators. However, because their institutional base of power
is closed and organized along Western models, consensual politics sooner
or later fails. Representing no outside constituencies, members of the
inner-circle increasingly represent the narrow interest of the circle itself
and their own personal interests. Consensual politics merges into the
politics of the ruling group. In turn, it may become sycophantic, removing all constraints on the arbitrary exercise of power by the leader who
started out simply as a primis inter pares ~ The ruled are effectively
excluded from the process and are powerless to do much about it largely
because habituated to a non-conflictual approach to governance occurring
at local communities, they are beyond their depths in the centralized
interest group orientation of national politics. The result is what appears,
to the outside observer as apathy.
If this analysis of the failure of accountability in contemporary
African societies is accurate, then the relevance of law in the process is
manifest. First, it consists in understanding the internal structures and processes of contemporary African societies, especially the ways in which
these societies differ from those that have been extensively analyzed and
m
23

See Ayitte, supra note 208, at 71-149.
See generally ACHEBE, supra note * (providing a fictional account of this process

among the Igbo).
224 See CHiNuA ACHEBE, ANTHmiLLS OF THE SAVANNAH (1981).
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against the backdrop of which the dominant models and theories of law
and development have been fashioned. Second, law provides a ready and
serviceable language for articulating the conceptualization of institutions,
ideas, and processes for constraining leadership so that it takes cognizance
of and responds to a society's needs and experiences. In this sense, the
desire for the rule of law is both universal and particularistic. Law
provides a universal language through institutionally mandated impositions
of constraints on the exercise of power, and insists that the language be
interpreted in the context of local conditions. Law offers a means of
regulating the inter-penetration of the state into society and society into
the state.
It is worth repeating that the argument here is not that African
societies are traditional or that they are split between traditional and
modem sectors. The claim being advanced is that they are distinctly
different, and that the institution and workings of the post-colonial state
reflect that difference. It is one thing for colonial governance to have
destroyed the traditional structures and mode of governance within Africa,
it is quite another thing to infer from such destruction the creation of a
society in the image of the colonial powers. African societies should not
be presumed to be traditional, modem, or a hybrid of the two. What is
needed is an understanding of the societies that have emerged from and
continue to be created by the interaction of African peoples and institutions as they seek to shape their aspirations within available resources and
mold those resources to satisfy their needs and desires.
Law has a central role in assuring the organization and functioning
of African societies, in particular the state and the economy, and reflects
the complex forces at work in an environment that has been subjected to
numerous and often contradictory forces. Africans need not ignore their
past to achieve economic prosperity, nor can they be sanguine about the
discordance of their past institutional developments and contemporary
forces. Like their current history, their conception of law must borrow
from several sources. It must reflect the distribution of power within their
societies at a given time as well as act to constrain the arbitrary use of
that power. This can be done only through the institutionalization of
processes and ideas that flow from within society itself.
2. Harmonizing Internal Development with External Pressures
The proposition that law and development studies ought to focus
primarily on the internal dynamics of the society at issue raises epistemic
and practical problems for the student and subject. Is the discipline more
than an extension of area studies? What place does it have in a law
school curriculum, especially on the faculty of a university located outside
the area under study? What remaining attraction does it have for pro-
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grams in comparative, international, and economic law? What interest
would it hold for those who control institutional research funding?'
Moreover, what stake does the foreign investor have in a society preoccupied with understanding itself? These are critical questions for which
there are no simple and convenient answers. However, the internal focus
advocated here is essential to the task of law and development, and that
far from precluding the participation of international scholars, practitioners, and their clients, it beckons for their involvement.
Central to the role of law in development is the dialectical understanding of law as a significant and frequently effective force in shaping
behavior, embedded within and springing from the institutional structures
and social practices of a community. The conventional approach to law
and development focuses on one or the other. Because much of that work
has been undertaken by Western scholars among whom the instrumentalist
and positivist view of law as behavior molding has tended to command
broad acceptance, the synthetic balance of the dialectic has been missing.
An imperative for law and development is restoring to the field discussion of the nature, structure, and relevance of the social practices of
the people and societies whose lives the field purports to seek to understand. The utility of a dialectical methodology lies not in establishing the
dominance of one set of relationships, but in its efficacy to illuminate the
convergence of the numerous forces always at work even in the simplest
of social interactions. The industrial, financial, and commercial successes
of the Western world; its technological innovations; the informational
hegemony of its epistemic classes; and the drive, ambition, technocratic,
and managerial efficiencies displayed in abundance by its professional
classes: all of these have lent the aura of incontestable truth and rectitude
to the assertive universalist claims being made for what are essentially
Western institutions and social practices. To the extent that law and
development scholars and practitioners continue to rely predominantly on
an unidirectional view of law as the regulation of behavior by the state,
or as the imposition or inculcation of well-tried and true successful
Western practices and institutions on emerging societies, the chances are
that Sub-Saharan African societies will remain an enigma to law and
development scholars, mired in their own impoverishment and misery.
As an illustration, consider that the most obvious distinction between
societies that are the focus of law and development and those that are not
is the significant gap in material welfare. The distinction has generated
other claims of superiority or inferiority. An undeniable example of the
' The issues raised by these questions were decisive in the waning of interest in
law and development studies in the mid-1970s. The triumph of capitalism and the profit
motive suggests that twenty years later remain salient considerations.
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latter is the claim of economic and technological dependency. It is simply
the case that developing societies do not generate from within the economic resources or the technical know-how for self-directed growth. No
society, not even continent-sized ones like the United States, is an
autarchy, yet the capacity of a country to exploit its resources
independently is a measure of that country's development. That capacity
has a direct bearing on the policies the country will pursue. For the
foreseeable future, relative independence on this sphere will be denied
most Sub-Saharan African countries.
Generally speaking, there are two potential catalysts for the involvement of outsiders in the exploitation of the resources of a society: the
abundance of exploitable resources and the configuration of political
forces. European investments in the Americas in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries illustrate the former case, while U.S. investments
in Western Europe and East Asia in the post-World War II period
illustrate the latter.
These are necessary, but not sufficient conditions. Relative certainty
about the future is a guarantee demanded by all foreign investors. Where
the foreign investment is driven by political conditions, predictability
depends very much on an evaluation of the commitment of the foreign
power guarantor of the political environment in the host country. In the
1950s-1970s, U.S. hegemony in Western Europe and East Asia provided
the requisite assurance of stability in those regions. Where, however, the
pool of foreign investment is driven by the abundance of resources in the
host country, the foreign investor is compelled to look to other sources.
One such source is the possible application of external force, a not
unusual occurrence with regard to Egypt and especially Latin America in
the late nineteenth century.'
However, this approach is generally
frowned on today, and it is in this context that commentators invoke law
and 7 the legal order as possible guarantors of predictability and stabili22
ty.

" The British colonization of Egypt began with the expedition to Alexandria in
1882 ostensibly to assure that debts incurred by the grandiose building projects of the
Khedive were paid off. See P.J. VATEKOTKIS, A HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT (1991).
The Calvo doctrine which required a foreign investor as a condition for investing
in a Latin American country to foreswear resort to the assistance of its government in
any disputes was a legal response to the history of cultural or threatened military
interventions by the European and North American home countries of the foreign
investors. This history of interventions has analogies in China, and was the impetus for
the colonialization of Africa.
m The fundamental shift in approach was confirmed by the response of the United
States to the Mexican nationalization of foreign interests in the petroleum industry in
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But as demonstrated, if law is defined in terms of substantive or
procedural rules, regulations, statutes, and standards, the logic of the
claim that predictability flows from its existence is at best unconvincing.
Aside from the absence of any historical support for it, the claim is particularly spurious if one focuses on the existence of those codes, rules,
and standards that are especially geared to attract the foreign investor.2
Because such law generally fails to embody internal social conventions,
it often amounts to no more than the paper on which it is written. Far
from enhancing predictability, it is a source of confusion and invariably
a trap for the unweary. 9 If the foreign investor meaningfully is to look
to law as a source of protection, she must view law in a broader sense.
The law of foreign investment is not an isolated corpus of international or transnational law, but an integral part of the social conventions
of a society that speaks to the structures of that society: dynamic historical relationships, social organizations, economic distributions, apportionment of political power, and the future aspirations of the members of
the society. By seeking to understand these forces, the foreign investor
and its lawyers can contribute towards the institutionalization and channelling of those productive forces within the society that appear responsive
both to the imperatives of the society and to a more predictable future for
foreign investment.
Despite recent challenges to the dominant ideas of sovereignty,
contemporary jurisprudence looks to the state as the ultimate arbiter of
relationships within the territory of the state, whether those relationships
are among the inhabitants, or between the inhabitants and outsiders.
The outsider tends to focus on the state as if it were the sole actor. But
the state is not a standardized entity. It is continually being reproduced
through its penetration by the various components of society. Similarly,
1938. See generally Chua, supra note 79.

' The discussion presented here is in the context of law as a pool for foreign
investment, but excludes the factors that push the foreign investor into investing in
particular societies. Typically, factors within the investor's own country such as tarifffree imports, diaspora-spawned ethnic solidarity, and the desire to foil political success
by a hated or feared ideology have been instrumental in channelling foreign investment
by U.S. persons into societies like Israel, Ireland, Korea, and the Caribbean. Many
African-Americans increasingly argue for U.S. investments in Africa in these terms.
These push factors tend to be discussed unashamedly in political rather than legal
terms.
23

See generally, Gordon, supra note 57.
Although these challenges have been most vociferously articulated by those in the

human rights industry, the claim that sovereignty as traditionally understood is passe,
arose in the context of the global spread of multinational corporations. See, e.g., RAY
VERNON, SoVEREiGNTY AT BAY (1968).
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the effectiveness of the state as an actor depends in significant measure
on its linkages with the society that it seeks to dominate. In Africa, those
linkages have been much weaker than in Western Europe or North
America. Understanding the level and limitations of such inter-penetration
is as important as appreciating the dynamic role that social change plays
in the constitution of the state. While law cannot be an independent
variable in either process, it can contribute through its interpretive and
analytical methods in facilitating the institutionalization of these interpenetrations through which relevant linkages are formed.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1953, seven years before the annus mirabili of modem African
history,"1 and eight years after the global cataclysm that sped and
shaped the events of that year, Amos Tutuola published a modem Black
African work of fiction: The Palm-Wine Drinkard And His Dead Palmwine Tapster In The Deads' Town;2 a work remarkable for prefiguring
the post-colonial African experience. From the beginning dramatic assertion
I was a palm-wine drinkard since I was a boy of ten years of age. I
had no other work more than to drink palm-wine in my life.
The novel relenitlessly unfolds a voyage of discovery that is fantastically
realistic, unwavering in purpose but digression-ridden, and prophetic by
being anchored entirely in the present.
The Palm-Wine Drinkard is ostensibly the story of the maturation to
adulthood of an eponymous narrator through experiences gained in the
search for his sole valuable product: the Palm-Wine Tapster. The oldest
of eight children in a family of hard workers, the narrator distinguishes
himself from them by being an "expert palm-wine drinkard. ' 3
"I was drinking palm-wine from morning to night and from night to
morning .... And when my father noticed that I could not do any
work more
than to drink, he engaged an expert palm-wine tapster for
4
me."23

in 1960, seventeen African countries representing more than half of the
I'
continent's population became independent, self-governing states.
232 AMos
TUTUOLA, THE PALM-WINE DRINKARD AND His DEAD PALM-WINE
TAPsTER IN THE DEADS' TOWN (1953).
23 Id. at 7.
Z'

Id.

19971

LAW IN DEVELOPMENT

259

Six months after the palm-wine drinkard's father dies, his tapster
falls off a palm-wine tree and dies as well. Unable to replace him, and
losing his friends who ceased taking notice of him in the absence of any
palm-wine to drink, the palm-wine drinkard sets out to find his old
tapster.
At the beginning of this trip, he is armed only with the ju-ju belonging to him and his father, and the general knowledge that "old people
were saying that the whole people who had died in this world did not go
to Heaven directly, but they were living in one place somewhere in this
world., , 's
Thus equipped, the palm-wine drinkard began his travels to obtain
information regarding the location of his tapster, where he is obliged to
engage in uneven matches with superhuman beings, all of which he
overcomes not by physical strength, but by demonstrations of wit and
intellectual acuity. Through it all, the lowly man is on equal footing with
gods and death; gods, spirits, and death are shown to be no more honorable in their dealings than is man.'
The palm-wine drinkard journeys from the idle land of the living to
that of the incomprehensible dead and back, encountering the phantasmic
kingdoms of myriad animals and plants that inhabit the lush tropical
forests and the homes of spirits that populate the mythical and real world.
What develops is not the enrichment of the stor-'teller's individual mind,
as the narrator is as averse to work at the end of the story as he is at the
beginning. His perceptions of good and evil appear to undergo no change,
and his understanding of the human spirit seems no better or worse at the
end of the story than it was at its beginning. Moreover, he is rendered
immortal and free from physical wants, but not free from fear. 7
The persistence and predictability of the individual psyche, however,
contrasts sharply with the rich portrayal of the varying social and organizational structures within which the narrator and the numerous interlopers
he encounters in the course of his journeys are required to interact,
experiences to which the narrator always remains unflinchingly open. The
systematic exploration of the virtues and demerits of diverse systems and
institutions; the successes and failures of the adaptation of those institutions to the needs of the inhabitants and communities that they regulate;
the coming into being of new institutions as a response to the failures of
others: these are the trenchant observations of the palm-wine drinkard.

2

Id. at 9.

2 Id. at 11-58.
2n

Id.
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No one, perhaps not even Amos Tutuola, can state the extent to
which The Palm-Wine Drinkard was intended as an allegory. While
lauded by many, it evokes quite different forms of admiration that may
correlate to the socio-geographic location of the reader. For Western
critics, the frequent incorrect usage of the English language, the lack of
standardization in the form, syntax, and even content of the story,
constitute powerful devices that enrich the allegorical tale. For at least
one African critic, these devices are unconscious flaws to be tolerated in
an otherwise great story. 8 The strength of the story lies not in its
individual recreation, but in its continuity within a well-established line of
Yoruba folk-tales, a lineage that it adequately represents.
For a Western-trained African critic, this raises a dilemma. Should
the telling of a local story in a foreign language be applauded because
the story reaches a wider audience and avoids the possible mortality of
the story in a transformed world, or should it be denounced on the
ground that the rendition impoverishes the story, rendering it neither the
local tale nor the voice of the foreign language? But is it possible to
provide even a tentative answer to this question without ascribing some
universalist interpretive function for Tutuola's tale beyond the temporal
entertainment of the listener? In writing the way that he did, was Amos
Tutuola's tale for the barely literate Nigerian with a rudimentary grasp of
the English language, or is it a tale that transcends linguistic barriers in
the telling of a timeless story?
The place of law in the development process is not unlike that of
literature to the aesthetically inclined humanist, and much like that of
technological know-how to contemporary societies. At first blush, the
image is one of undifferentiated beauty or ugliness. We have a preformed
perception of clarity as to what succeeds or fails, and we do not doubt
the universal correctness and applicability of our standards of judgment
and rectitude. On closer inspection, however, these certainties become less
evident. We discover that the strength of law, like that of literature and
technology, lies in the capacity of broadly framed ideas to interact with
pre-existing conditions, and in the process, to transform those conditions
for the purpose of meeting, not transcending, the needs of a people.
The temptation of imposing law from without is great. The short-run
costs appear much less than those for law's internal development. Moreover, the imported product appears well-tested and functionally superior
to the homegrown variety. Yet, such perceptions are at best superficial,

2'
See Abiola Irele, Tradition and the Yoruba Writer: D.O. Fagunwa, Amos Tutuola
and Wole Soyinka, in THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN LITERATURE AND IDEOLoGY 174,
174-97 (1990).
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serving primarily to give the outsider a sense of being needed while
disempowering and impoverishing those for whose asserted benefit the
outside product is being adopted.
To survive and reproduce itself, law must be generated from within
and must serve to transform and enrich pre-existing domestic institutions
and practices generated and fostered by those to whose daily lives the
institutions and practices are integral. This is essential if law is to serve
both the physical necessities and comforts of a people as well as their
ideological and social aspirations.
In post-colonial African societies, the essence of law is neither the
maintenance of tradition, nor the bringing of modernity to African societies. The future does not require that Africans choose between dualism
and Westernization. The difficult but necessary role for law lies in
helping Africans decipher and articulate principled mechanisms by which
their experiences can be structured and institutionalized. In doing so,
borrowing some of the language of legitimation in the Western legal
tradition is likely to be unavoidable, but the direct approximation of the
practices represented by such language may be solely coincidental. Law
reflects and represents the necessity of collective interactions and the
subjection of the individual to social constraints. In its articulation and
interpretive force, it must remain cognizant of the nature and depth of
those interactions and constraints.
For an African interested in the role that law plays in development,
the fundamental question is not whether such a role does exist, as one
must take it on faith that it does, nor is it whether the experiences of one
society are relevant or helpful to other societies. The issue to be investigated, attempted to be made comprehensible, and perhaps in other ways
useful, must be the forces that within a given society shape the interactions among the social and political institutions of that society, its people,
and the quest by those people for greater security in their well-being.
Law, flowing from the experiences of the people, forms an essential
backdrop of the social institutions within which the quest is undertaken.
Incorporating the understanding of those generally ignored experiences
into a field that aims for universality, that equates globalism with
Westernization, and economic success with development and humanitarianism, is the challenge for law and development.

